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The Anxiety of Influence1: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying
Richard Briffault
I.

The Regulation of Lobbying
A. Two Views of Lobbying
In 1843, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court warned that “already has a class of persons

arisen, at the seat of the general government and elsewhere, who make it a business to . . .
procure the passage of an Act of the Legislature.”2 “The arts and misrepresentations” of these
“designing men” raised the unsettling prospect of “mislead[ing]” members of the legislature
“from the paths of duty.” The court acknowledged there was no evidence that anyone retained to
persuade the state legislature had actually engaged in any misconduct, but the practice had a
“tendency . . . in the hands of designing and corrupt men to improper tampering with members,
and the use of extraneous, secret influence over an important branch of government.” 3

The

“designing and corrupt men” that so troubled the Pennsylvania court in Clippinger v. Hepbaugh
were lobbyists, and the court’s concern that lobbying – that is, the use of paid agents to influence
government action -- necessarily raises the prospect of “improper tampering” and the “use of
extraneous, secret influence” to shape public policy remains a driving force shaping the legal
treatment of lobbying.
Yet, courts have also long recognized that lobbying has a legitimate place in our system
of representative government. As New York’s highest court observed in 1893, “[i]t must be the
right of every citizen who is interested in any proposed legislation to employ an agent, for
compensation payable to him, to draft his bill and explain it to any committee, or the legislature,
1

Apologies to Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (1973).
Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & Serg. 315, 320-21 (Pa. 1843).
3
Id.
2
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fairly and openly, and ask to have it introduced.”4 To be sure, the New York court emphasized
that merely drafting and explaining bills to legislators and requesting their introduction did not
involve asking members of the legislature actually to vote for those bills, so that such activity did
not involve the “lobby services,” which the court “condemned as against public policy.”
According to the court, the plaintiff was “not a lobbyist” because “he had no acquaintance or
influence with any member of the legislature, and it does not appear that he had any peculiar
facilities for procuring legislation.”5 Today, however, we would certainly view the efforts of a
hired agent to draft a bill, explain it to legislators, and seek the bill’s introduction as lobbying.
The law of lobbying grows out of the tension between these two views of lobbying –
what might be called the “good” lobbying, that is, the preparation and explanation of legislation,
regulation, or policy proposals to advance the interests of members of the public; and the “bad”
lobbying, such as the use of “extraneous, secret influence,” “peculiar facilities,” and “tampering”
with legislators. In the public’s mind, the “bad” vision of lobbying clearly dominates the “good”
one. Lobbyists like the notorious Jack Abramoff 6 have featured prominently in scandals
involving members of Congress, and candidates and elected officials compete to denounce
lobbyists and to decry lobbyists’ influence on government. Lobbying has become a “very dirty
word,”7 a virtual synonym for corruption.

Indeed, the term is so toxic that the American

League of Lobbyists – the lobbyists’ trade association -- dropped “lobbyist” from its name and is
4

Chesebrough v. Conover, 140 N.Y. 382, 387 (1893).
Id.
6
Jack Abramoff was a politically powerful Washington lobbyist from the mid-1990s until his activities came under
federal scrutiny starting in 2004. As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
observed, the Department of Justice investigation into his activities “unearthed evidence of corruption so extensive
that it ultimately implicated more than twenty public officials, staffers and lobbyists.” United States v. Ring, 706
F.3d 460, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2013). See also United States v. Safavian, 649 F.3d 688 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (affirming
conviction of General Services Administration chief of staff who accepted a golf trip to Scotland from Abramoff).
7
Dan Eggen, “In midterm elections, Washington lobbying becomes a line of attack for both parties,” Washington
Post, Oct. 6, 2010.
5
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now the “Association of Government Relations Professionals.”8 But legal doctrine also reflects a
recognition of the “good” lobbying – the right of individuals, groups, organizations, businesses,
nonprofit associations, states and local governments,9 unions and other groups on their own or
through paid representatives to seek to influence government action. Like campaign finance,
lobbying is an essential part of modern democracy that simultaneously triggers deep-seated
concerns about the impact of private wealth and special interests on public policy. Again like
campaign finance, lobbying regulation strives to hold together the differing and sometimes
conflicting goals of protecting constitutional rights of speech, association, and petition;
controlling undue influence and improper efforts to shape government decision-making; and
promoting the transparency of the political process.

Indeed, lobbying and campaign finance

regulation are increasingly linked, as reformers, lawmakers, and academics have begun to give
greater attention to the lobbying-campaign finance nexus.
Lobbying is a big business. At the federal level, lobbyists reported spending
approximately $3.5 billion a year during the 2009-12 period.10 There is also extensive lobbying
at the state and local level. Lobbying expenditures with respect to the New York state

8

See Megan R, Wilson, “K Street group strikes ‘lobbyist’ from name,” The Hill, Nov. 18, 2013,
http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-a-lobbying/190639-k-street-group-strikes-lobbyist-from-name.
9
See, e.g., Andrew Doughman, “Local governments spend $3 million to lobby Legislature – for tax increases,” Las
Vegas Sun, July 24, 2013,
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2013/jul/24/local-governments-spend-3-million-lobby-legislatur/; “Local
governments lobby Minnesota Legislature with $7.8 million in 2012,” Sctimes.com, July 17, 2013,
http://www.sctimes.com/viewart/20130717/NEWS01/307170049/Local-governments-lobby-Minnesota-Legislature7-8-million-2012; Brian M. Rosenthal, “Local governments spend big to lobby Legislature,” The Seattle Times,
June 18, 2013 (government entities – cities, counties, ports, Native American tribes, public utility districts and
school districts – were the biggest category of lobbying spenders in Washington state),
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2021218481_governmentlobbyingxml.html.
10
See OpenSecrets.org, “Lobbying Database,” http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby. Total reported federal lobbying
spending was $3.50 billion in 2009, $3.55 billion in 2010, $3.33 billion in 2011, and $3.30 billion. Id.
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government, for example, are running at more than $200 million per year.11 These numbers
almost certainly understate actual lobbying expenditures. At the federal level, a significant
fraction – perhaps as much as half -- of “people currently employed as policy advocates” in
Washington do not register as lobbyists 12 but instead, like former House Speaker Newt
Gingrich, claim only to be giving “historical advice,”13 or, more commonly, like former Senate
Majority Leader Tom Daschle, claim to be “strategic advisers” who shape lobbying strategy
behind the scenes but do not engage in the direct contact with policymakers that triggers the
statutory definition of lobbying. 14 Moreover, at least at the federal level, even registered
lobbyists do not have to report media expenditures or social media activities intended to
influence the broader political and policy environment, even though such “campaign-style
advocacy” is central to contemporary lobbying.15
Lobbying is a heavily regulated activity, with both the extent and pace of regulation
increasing. Congress, 16 all fifty states, 17 and many local governments 18 have enacted laws

11

See New York State Joint Commission on Public Ethics, 2012 Annual Report (2013) at 33 (reported lobbying
spending was $213 million in 2010, $220 million in 2011, and $205 million in 2012). Lobbying expenses with
respect to the New Jersey government were a record $65.6 million in 2010, up from $57.6 million in 2009, see
Lobbying Up, Philadelphia Inquirer, March 9, 2011,
http://www.philly.com/philly/multimedia/Lobbying_in_New_Jersey.html?view=graphic.
12
See Timothy M. LaPira and Herschel F. Thomas III, “Just How Many Newt Gingrich’s Are There on K Street?
Estimating the True Size and Shape of Washington’s Revolving Door,” April 2, 2013,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2241671.
13
During one of the debates during the 2011-12 contest for the Republican presidential nomination, former Speaker
Gingrich responded to the request that he explain what he had done to earn a payment of $300,000 from mortgage
giant Freddie Mac by stating that he had not lobbied but had offered “historical advice” relevant to the mortgage
crisis. See, e.g., Politico, Republican Debate: 7 Attacks on Newt Gingrich to Watch, Dec. 15,
2011.http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1211/70230_Page2.html.
14
See, e.g., Chris Frates, “Lobbyists call bluff on ‘Daschle exemption,” Politico, July 26, 2010; Kate Ackley,
“Lobbying Without a Trace,” Roll Call, March 20, 2013. See also Thomas Edsall, “The Shadow Lobbyist,” N.Y.
Times, April 25, 2013, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/the-shadow-lobbyist/?_r=0.
15
See, e.g., Gary Andres, “Campaign-Style Advocacy: A Broader View of Lobbying,” 11 The Forum 3 (2013);
accord, Thomas B. Edsall, “The Unlobbyists,” N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/01/opinion/edsall-the-unlobbyists.html?_r=0.
16
See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq (disclosure of lobbying activities).
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regulating lobbying. Many of these measures have recently been revised and updated, and new
proposals for lobbying regulation, as part of government ethics or political reform packages, are
frequently advanced in Congress and many state and local legislatures. 19 Lobbying is also
directly affected by such other measures as the Internal Revenue Code, the Foreign Agents
Registration Act (FARA),20 procurement laws, executive orders and internal legislative rules.
This article examines the legal framework for the regulation of lobbying. The remainder
of this Part lays out the values shaping lobbying regulation and the regulatory techniques that
follow from those values. Part II considers how courts, particularly the United States Supreme
Court, have treated lobbying. Parts III through V then address the principal issues that are
attracting the attention of legislators, are contested in litigation, or are on various reform
agendas, including the campaign finance activities of lobbyists; lobbying by former government
officials (the “revolving door” problem); and the scope and contents of lobbyist disclosure
requirements. Part VI briefly concludes.
B. Values Driving Lobbying Regulation
The regulation of lobbying has been shaped by four principal concerns:
17

See, e.g., National Conference of State Legislatures (hereinafter “NCSL”), “Lobbyist Activity Report
Requirements,” (updated January 2013)
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/ethicshome/50-state-chart-lobbyist-report-requirements.aspx.
18
See, e.g., N.Y.C. Admin Code, §§ 3-211 et seq, http://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/html/lobbying/law_admin.shtml;
City of Chicago, Governmental Ethics Ordinance, §§2-156-210 et seq,, Municipal Code of Chicago,
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/ethics/general/Ordinances/GEO-Jan-2013.pdf; Municipal
Lobbying Ordinance, Los Angeles Municipal Code, §§ 48.01 et seq, http://ethics.lacity.org/PDF/laws/law_mlo.pdf.
19
For only a handful of recent examples, see Nicholas Kuznets, “IMPACT: Georgia governor signs bills limiting
gifts from lobbyists,” Center for Public Integrity, May 7, 2013,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/05/07/12622/impact-georgia-governor-signs-bills-limiting-gifts-lobbyists;
Nathan Shaker, “Mayor signs revision to Philadelphia Lobbying Law,” Lobby Comply Blog, Nov.1, 2011,
http://67.39.100.124/wordpress/?p=6291; Cy Ryan, Bill on Lobbyist Spending on Legislators Introduced, Las Vegas
Sun, Mar. 1, 2011; Chris Joyner, Commission Expands Definition of Lobbyist, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Mar. 7,
2011; Sarita Chourey, SC Lobbyists Face Tighter Restrictions, The Augusta Chronicle, Mar. 31, 2011; Beveridge
& Diamond, “Expansion of the Massachusetts’ Lobbying Law May Catch Many Unaware,” 2010,
http://www.bdlaw.com/news-797.html.
20
22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq.
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(1) protection of the opportunity for individuals, groups, and organizations to lobby, that
is, to present facts, arguments, and views to legislative and executive branch officials;
(2) prevention of improper influence on government action;
(3) promotion of a level playing field by restricting unfair or unequal opportunities to
influence government action; and
(4) provision for the transparency of lobbyist-government official interactions.
The first concern is aimed at preventing regulations that would interfere with the ability
of people to lobby or use lobbyists to inform and influence government action. Lobbying is an
aspect of the freedoms of speech, press, association, and petition protected by the constitution.
Lobbying can advise government officials about conditions in particular industries, geographic
areas, government subunits, or socio-economic groups; the costs and benefits of proposed laws
and regulations; the consequences of government actions under consideration; and the views of
those affected by potential government decisions. It is a means of political expression, a form of
popular participation in government, and a tool for educating government decision-making.
But if the first value of lobbying regulation is to assure that the core right to communicate
with government is not abridged, the second goal reflects the concern that lobbying can be, and
often has been, accompanied by inappropriate techniques inconsistent with public-regarding
decision-making. Lobbying should inform and thereby improve government action, not distort it
by appeals to the private self-interest of decision-makers. The principal concern here is not with
the communicative aspect of lobbying per se, but with activities ancillary to communication that
may improperly influence government action. To be sure there is no widely agreed-upon
definition of the proper influences on government action – such as whether and to what extent an
elected official should consider the needs or preferences of her local constituency versus the state
6

or nation as a whole; the implications of a vote or decision for her reelection; or the views of the
leaders of her political party or her supporters in the last election. But it is generally recognized
that it is improper for a public official to take an official action in exchange for, in response to, or
in order to obtain a private or personal material benefit. The widespread criminal prohibitions of
bribery and illegal gratuities reflect the belief that it is improper to provide officials with material
benefits in exchange for, in response to, or to influence their official actions. As criminal laws,
they are focused on situations in which the private benefit is closely linked a specific official act,
But the concern about improper private influence on government goes beyond relatively clear cut
quid pro quos. Improper influence may occur when private benefits – such as free meals,
entertainment, travel, or investment opportunities – are not linked to specific official acts but are
intended merely to facilitate access, provide opportunities for quasi-social interaction, smooth
relations, or promote good will towards the lobbyists and the interests they represent. Even
though not tied to specific official actions, such benefits can still distract government
decision-makers from the public interest or skew the formation of public policy. As a result, they
constitute a form of improper influence that may be subject to regulation.
A third goal is preventing some lobbyists from obtaining unfair or unequal influence
relative to others. The concerns about improper and unfair influence overlap. If one lobbyist
provides an official with a material benefit and others do not, this may constitute both improper
and unfair influence. But the concern about unfair influence focuses in particular on lobbyists
who, based on their past or present relationships with government officials, may have
opportunities for special access to officials that are not available to other people attempting to
communicate with these officials. This has been an impetus for the rules intended to limit the
ability of former government officials to lobby agencies or branches of government where they
7

recently worked, that is, so-called “cooling off” or “revolving door” restrictions.21 The concern
about unequal influence can also be seen underlying the laws governing the tax treatment of
lobbying. Under the Internal Revenue Code, businesses may not treat lobbying expenditures as
deductible ordinary and necessary business expenses,22 while a charitable organization entitled
to receive tax-deductible contributions under section 501(c)(3) will forfeit that favorable tax
treatment if “attempting, to influence legislation” constitutes a “substantial part” of its
activities. 23 Both of these tax provisions reflect the view that deductibility is a form of
government subsidy inconsistent with a level playing field for lobbying. Similarly, the Byrd
Amendment,24 which bars the use of funds appropriated by Congress to lobby for federal
contracts, grants, loans, and cooperative agreements, reflects Congress’s concern not to subsidize
some lobbying activity. To be sure, the impact of the value of preventing unequal influence is
quite limited. Lobbying involves the expenditure of private funds, and different individuals,
firms, groups, and organizations have widely different amounts of resources available to them.
They are, thus, capable of spending widely different amounts on lobbying. In theory,
equalization could be advanced by capping the spending of those with great resources or
subsidizing the lobbying of those without resources. However, limits on lobbying expenditures,
like limits on campaign expenditures, would run straight into the First Amendment. There is no
constitutional objection to offering subsidies for lobbying, but with thousands upon thousands of

21

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 207. For federal revolving door restrictions, see generally Jack Maskell,
“Post-Employment, ‘Revolving Door,’ Laws for Federal Personnel,” Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress, 7-5700 (Sept. 13, 2012).
22
Section 162(e) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
provides that expenses incurred in attempting to influence federal or state legislation, administrative action or
referenda may not be deducted as business expenses.
23
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
24
13 U.S.C. § 1352.
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bills, amendments, appropriations, regulations and other measures subject to lobbying each year,
it is difficult to see how lobbying with respect to any specific measure or issue area could be
equalized, although it would certainly be possible to provide subsidies or tax breaks to
organizations that lobby on behalf of politically weak or underrepresented groups. Instead of
addressing lobbying inequality generally, the level-playing-field goal tends to focus more
narrowly on inequalities that flow from government action, such as the provision of government
funds and tax benefits to some but not other lobbyists, or the benefits some lobbyists may obtain
from prior government service.
(4) The goal of transparency is central to contemporary lobbying regulation. Indeed, with
the proliferation of open meetings laws, freedom of information laws, public access to records
laws, public official financial disclosure laws and other “government in the sunshine” measures,
transparency has become a central focus of the regulation of government operations.
Transparency can promote public understanding of how government works, enable the people to
better assess government performance, seek change, and hold government accountable for its
actions. Measures promoting transparency do not of their own force actually prohibit any
lobbying or activities ancillary to lobbying, but they may discourage practices that are, or are
likely to be perceived as, improper or unfair. As Justice Brandeis famously observed nearly a
century ago, “[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”25
It is sometimes asserted that transparency promotes public confidence in government. It
is not clear if this is really the case. Greater public attention to the nitty-gritty of government
operations, to the battling of party and group interests, the pulling and hauling and the wheeling
25

Brandeis, “What Publicity Can Do,” Harper’s Weekly, Dec. 20, 1913, at 10.

9

and dealing inherent in legislative decision-making could be demoralizing rather than
confidence-building. The dictum often (perhaps mistakenly) attributed to Bismarck that “laws,
like sausages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as we know how they are made”26 may be
more accurate. Nevertheless, the public is surely likely to be anxious when interactions between
lawmakers and lobbyists are hidden behind closed doors. As a result, transparency may be
valuable in ameliorating public suspicions about lobbyist-government misconduct even if it does
not produce confidence in the results of the disclosed interactions. Certainly, transparency
facilitates public oversight and pressure for the adoption of reforms to address forms of improper
or unfair influence that transparency may reveal.
C. Techniques of Lobbying Regulation
Lobbying regulatory techniques follow from the values driving regulation. Commitment
to the petitioning, associational, and communicative activity at the core of lobbying means that
lobbying per se – that is, the fact and substantive content of the advocacy of legislation,
administrative action, or policy proposals – cannot be prohibited or limited in amount. As a
result, one technique is, in a sense, no-regulation. Unlike, say, in campaign finance, where
federal and many state laws restrict contributions to candidates or political parties, there is no
restriction on the use of private funds to hire lobbyists and pay for lobbying expenditures.
Indeed, even regulatory fees imposed on lobbyists as part of registration and reporting
requirements have been subject to constitutional oversight; when found to be greater than
necessary to cover the costs of enforcing those requirements, fees may be struck down as an
26

According to Professor Fred Shapiro the quip so frequently associated with Bismarck was really first uttered by
“lawyer-poet John Godfrey Saxe” in 1869, and was not generally attributed to Bismarck until the 1930s. see Fred R.
Shapiro, Quote . . . Misquote, N.Y. Times, July 21, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/21/magazine/27wwwl-guestsafire-t.html?_r=0.
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unconstitutional tax on lobbying.27
Although lobbying per se is constitutionally protected, some of the ancillary activities of
lobbyists, such as the provision of private benefits to public officials, can be restricted. Gifts, free
meals and entertainment, honoraria, and other private benefits to government officials may be
barred outright, subject to dollar limitations, restricted under some circumstances, or required to
be reported.28 Recently, concern about improper influence has begun to focus on the role of
lobbyists in financing election campaigns. Although campaign contributions and fundraising do
not provide elected officials with personal pecuniary benefits, as the funds so provided must be
used for electioneering activity, they can certainly be at least as effective in garnering the
attention and gratitude of officials who have to stand for reelection or want to seek higher office
as free dinners or complementary Super Bowl tickets. In addition, to reduce any temptation
lobbyists may feel to engage in improper activity, many jurisdictions regulate contingent fees,
primarily through prohibition but also through disclosure requirements.
The principal regulatory technique for addressing unfair or unequal influence is the
cooling-off period or revolving door law. These rules vary considerably with respect to the
determination of who ought to be regulated and the length and scope of the cooling-off
requirement, but the central idea is that for some period of time a former government employee
should be barred from lobbying the office where she used to work in order to prevent her from
taking advantage of the inside information and personal contacts she acquired at that office. At

27

See, e.g., Moffett v. Killian, 360 F. Supp. 228 (D. Conn. 1973); Fidanque v. Oregon Standards and Practices
Comm., 969 P.2d 376 (Ore. 1998); ACLU of Illinois v. White, 692 F. Supp.2d 896 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
28
See, e.g., Chip Nielsen, Jason D. Kaune, and Jennie Unger Skelton, “State Lobby and Gift Laws,” Practising Law
Institute, 2010, 1837 PLI/Corp 597; National Conference of State Legislatures, “Ethics: Legislator Gift Restrictions
Overview,” Updated March 2013,
ttp://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/ethicshome/50-state-table-gift-laws.aspx.
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the national level, the Obama Administration adopted a number of regulatory measures,
reflecting both the anti-improper influence and level playing field goals of barring lobbyists from
certain government positions – a “reverse revolving door” rule. Again, the underlying concern
appears to be that the official will be affected by personal connections to the lobbyists with
whom she used to work or the clients she used to represent, or by a psychological predisposition
to be sympathetic to the positions advocated by former colleagues or clients. This might give
them an unfair advantage over other firms or interest groups with a stake in the official’s
government decisions.
The value of transparency is widely advanced by federal, state and local lobbying
disclosure laws. Lobbyists are required to register with a designated regulator and then file
periodic reports concerning their activities. The reports tend to focus on the money trail, that is,
the funds paid by clients or principals to lobbyists, and the funds spent by lobbyists in the course
of their representational activities. Recent regulatory measures and proposed reforms have
sought to widen the scope of these reports to include, inter alia:

the disclosure of so-called

indirect spending intended to advance the lobbying agenda by persuading members of the public
to contact government decision-makers; greater disclosure of the groups that fund the
organization that is a lobbyist’s nominal client; and more information concerning the particular
officials contacted by lobbyists and the matters discussed with them.

II. Lobbying and the Constitution
The Supreme Court’s treatment of lobbying originally focused on the problem of lobbyist
contingency fees. In those series -- running from the mid-nineteenth through the early twentieth
centuries -- the Court demonstrated a very low regard for lobbying. In the 1950s, however, the
12

Court shifted focus and determined that lobbying is protected by the First Amendment. However,
even after reframing lobbying as a constitutionally protected activity, the Court has been willing
to uphold some regulation of lobbying, particularly disclosure.
A. In the Beginning: The Courts and Lobbying in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth
Centuries
In November 1847, Alexander Marshall, an experienced “lobby member” before the
Virginia legislature, wrote to the officials of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad proposing that they
retain him to help persuade the legislature to grant the railroad a certain right of way it wanted.
Marshall’s proposal stressed the need for “an active, interested, well-organized influence” in the
legislature. Marshall urged that the railroad
inspire your agents with an earnest, nay, an anxious wish for success. You must give
them nothing if they fail, endow them richly if they succeed . . . . My plan would aim to
place the “right-of-way” members on an equality with their adversaries [a competing
railroad], by sending down a corps of agents, stimulated by an active partisanship by the
strong lure of profit . . . Under this plan you pay nothing unless a law be passed which
your company will accept . . . . I have surveyed the difficulties of this undertaking, and
think they may be surmounted. The cash outlay for my own expenses, and those of the
subagents, would be heavy. I know the effective service of such agents as I would
employ cannot be had except on a heavy contingent. I should not like to undertake the
business on such terms, unless provided with a contingent fund of at least $50,000 [or
about $1.2 million in 2013 dollars], secured to my order on the passage of a law, and its
acceptance by your company.29
Marshall’s proposal stressed that he “contemplate[d] the use of no improper means or appliances
in the attainment of your purpose. My scheme is to surround the legislature with respectable and
influential agents, whose persuasive arguments may influence the members to do you a naked act
of justice.”30 Marshall did, however, emphasize the need to keep the arrangement secret “from
motives of policy alone, because an open agency would furnish ground of suspicion and
29
30

Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio RR Co., 57 U.S. 314, 317-19 (1854).
Id. at 318.
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unmerited invective, and might weaken the impression we seek to make.”31 Subsequently,
Marshall, claiming both that the arrangement had been agreed to by the railroad and that he had
won the railroad what it wanted from the Virginia legislature, sued the railroad over its failure to
pay his fee.
The dispute ultimately came before the United States Supreme Court, which dismissed
Marshall’s claim, finding the contract void for public policy. Although the Court determined that
“[a]ll persons whose interests may in any way be affected by any public or private act of the
legislature, have an undoubted right to urge their claims and arguments, either in person or by
counsel professing to act for them, before legislative committees,”32 Marshall’s concealment of
his role as the railroad’s agent was troubling: “A hired advocate or agent, assuming to act in a
different character, is practicing deceit on the legislature.”33 And the Court expressed concern
that the contingency arrangement would inevitably lead to improper influence and outright
corruption:
“Bribes in the shape of high contingent compensation, must necessarily lead to the use of
improper means and the exercise of undue influence. Their necessary consequence is the
demoralization of the agent who covenants for them; he is soon brought to believe that
any means which will produce so beneficial a result to himself are proper means; and that
a share of these profits may have the same effect of quickening the perceptions and
warming the zeal of influential or careless’ members in favor of his bill. The use of such
means and agents will have the effect to subject the State governments to the combined
capital of wealthy corporations, and produce universal corruption, commencing with the
representative and ending with the elector.”34
The Court concluded that “contracts for a contingent compensation for obtaining legislation, or
to use any personal or any secret influence or any secret or sinister influence on legislators, is
31

Id.
Id. at 334-35.
33
Id. at 335.
34
Id.
32
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void by policy of the law.”35
Marshall foreshadowed some of the principal themes of lobbying regulation today:
recognition of the right to present “claims and arguments” to the legislature and to hire
representatives to assist in doing so; hostility to secrecy and a preference for the transparency of
lobbying arrangements; and anxiety that lobbyists will employ improper means or exercise
undue influence in pursuit of their goals. Marshall focused on the potential for improper
influence inherent in secrecy and the use of contingency fees, but in other cases the Court treated
lobbying per se as troublesome. A decade after Marshall, the Supreme Court decided Providence
Tool Company v. Norris,36 which involved a contingent fee agreement pursuant to which a
lobbyist had secured Providence Tool a contract to provide muskets to the Union Army at the
outset of the Civil War. Justice Field declared that “all agreements for pecuniary considerations
to control the business operations of the Government, or the regular administration of justice, or
the appointments to public offices, or the ordinary course of legislation, are void as against
public policy, without reference to the question, whether improper means are contemplated or
used in their execution.”37 Inherent in lobbying is the “tendency . . . to introduce personal
solicitation and personal influence, as elements in the procurement of contracts; and thus directly
lead to inefficiency in the public service, and to unnecessary expenditures of the public funds.”38
Lobbying contracts were invalid “whether [or not] improper influences were contemplated or
used, but upon the corrupting tendency of the agreements,” and contingency agreements were
particularly problematic because of the incentive to “the use of sinister and corrupt means for the
35
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accomplishment of the end desired.”39
In Trist v. Child,40 decided a decade after Provident Tool, the Court clarified that some
contracts for “purely professional services” in presenting legislation to Congress would be valid
and enforceable.
“[D]rafting the petition to set forth the claim, attending to the taking of testimony,
collecting facts, preparing arguments, and submitting them orally or in writing to a
committee or other proper authority.Butsuch services are separated by a broad line of
demarcation from personal solicitation. 41
The Court provided as an example of objectionable activity a letter from the lobbyist to his client
urging him:
“Please write to your friends to write to any member of Congress. Every vote tells, and a
simple request may secure a vote, he not caring anything about it. Set every man you
know to work. Even if he knows a page, for a page often gets a vote.”
The Court strongly condemned such paid personal-solicitation lobbying:
“The agreement in the present case was for the sale of the influence and exertions of the
lobby agent to bring about the passage of a law for the payment of a private claim,
without reference to its merits, by means which, if not corrupt, were illegitimate, and
considered in connection with the pecuniary interest of the agent at stake, contrary to the
plainest principles of public policy.”42
To be sure, the contingent compensation aggravated the abuse. “[W]here the avarice of the agent
is inflamed by the hope of a reward contingent upon success, and to be graduated by a
percentage upon the amount appropriated, the danger of tampering in its worst form is greatly
increased.”43 But the reliance on “personal solicitation” to influence legislative action was itself
a problem.
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At the start of the twentieth century, the Court remained hostile to the payment of
compensation for lobbying. In Hazelton v. Sheckels,44 Justice Holmes determined that where
part of the consideration for a contract consisted of “services in procuring legislation upon a
matter of public interest” the contract could not be enforced.45 Similarly, in Earle v. Myers46 in
1907, the Court noted that “services . . . of the kind known as lobbying services” involving the
use of “personal influence and personal solicitation with members of Congress” were “illicit”
and claims for compensation for such services were unenforceable.47 On the other hand, in the
1927 decision in Steele v. Drummond,48 the Court found that a contract which required, in part,
that the plaintiff seek the enactment of local ordinances approving the construction of a proposed
railroad line in a particular location, was valid in the absence of a showing that the contract
“require[ed] or contemplate[ed] . . . action as a matter of favor by means of personal influence,
solicitation and the like, or by other improper or corrupt means.” Without evidence “that tends to
indicate that in the promotion or passage of [the ordinances] there was any departure from the
best standards of duty to the public,” the plaintiff’s claim would be enforced.49
These Supreme Court decisions are representative of a number of federal and state cases
from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that grappled with lobbying. Most dealt with the
propriety of paying for lobbyists’ services, whether under a contingent fee agreement or in suits
against corporate boards of directors or public bodies for authorizing the hiring of lobbyists.50
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Some of the early cases were particularly hostile to paid lobbyists. A New York court damned
the “swarms of hired retainers of the claimants upon public bounty or justice” as a threat to “free,
honorable, and correct” legislative deliberation,51 and a Tennessee court asserted that “[t]he
practice of lobbying is in its very nature demoralizing and corrupting.”52 Others recognized that
“the use of money to influence legislation is not always wrong. It depends upon the manner of its
use.”53 As the Kansas Supreme Court explained in 1871:
“If it be used to pay for the publication of circulars or pamphlets, or otherwise, or the
collection or distribution of information openly and publicly among the members of the
legislature, there is nothing objectionable or improper. But if it be used directly in bribing, or
indirectly in working up a personal influence upon individual members, conciliating them by
suppers, presents, or any of the machinery so well known to lobbyists, which aims to secure a
member’s vote without reference to his judgment, then it is not only illegal but one of the
grossest infractions of social duty of which an individual can, under the circumstances of the
present day, be guilty. . . . For it is the way of death to republican institutions.”54
Perhaps the most striking feature of these early cases, particularly those that struggled to
distinguish between proper and improper means of seeking legislative action is their view that
“personal influence,” “importunities to members of the legislature,” “seducing or influencing
them by any other arguments, persuasions, or inducements than such as directly and legitimately
bear upon the merits of the pending application”55 were improper actions akin to bribery and
corruption. Personal influence was often linked to lack of transparency, with courts referring to
“dishonest, secret, or unfair means;” 56 “secret and insidious overtures,” 57 or “the use of
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personal, or any secret or sinister, influence upon legislators.”58 But even in the absence of a
showing of bribery, secrecy, “hang[ing] around legislators for the purpose of influencing such
legislators whereby legislative action is to be procured,” 59 and the personal solicitation of
legislative votes were tantamount to corruption. Influence disconnected from substantive
information or public-regarding arguments about the merits of a measure – even without bribery
or criminal misconduct – tended to corrupt the legislative process. By contrast, more public
efforts – testimony in public hearings before legislative committees,60 “the collecting of facts,
and presenting them to the proper officers, making arguments thereon”61 -- and the use of
“special knowledge and training” derived from “years of study and experience” concerning the
issue in dispute -- were legitimate means of seeking legislative action.62
Although lobbying in this period was often treated as a shady, indeed, illicit activity – the
California constitution actually made lobbying a felony63 – legal condemnation did not extend to
all paid efforts to influence the legislature, but only those involving “bribery, promise of reward,
intimidation, or any other dishonest means.”64 The difference between this period and our own
was the widespread determination that lobbyists’ use of personal influence, including personal
solicitation of legislative votes, fell on the corruption side of the corruption/legitimate advocacy
divide. The particular problem with the contingency fee agreements that triggered much of this
litigation was that they were seen as providing an incentive to the use of improper means of
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seeking legislative action, even when the actual use of improper means had not been proven.65
But the deeper point was the courts’ tendency to conclude that legislative advocacy involving
private meetings, personal solicitations, and the use of personal influence – a term never
precisely defined, but used as a contrast to influence based on facts, “fair argument and
legitimate evidence”66 relating to the merits of a legislative proposal – went beyond the scope of
legitimate representation.
Although some courts in this period noted the value of appropriate advocacy in obtaining
laws that could advance the public interest,67 there was little discussion of constitutional law
and, in particular, no reference to the First Amendment. These were all common law contracts
cases, although often inflected by concerns about the needs of our republican form of
government.68 After World War II, however, issues involving the regulation of lobbying were
constitutionalized as the Supreme Court determined that lobbying involved First Amendment
rights. That development is the focus of the next section.
B. Lobbying and the First Amendment
In the 1950s, the Supreme Court reframed its analysis of lobbying from a focus on the
potential for improper influence latent in lobbyists’ efforts at personal persuasion of legislators to
the First Amendment’s protection of the communication about political and policy matters which
lies at the core of lobbying. The Court’s new approach, however, recognized that even though
protected by the First Amendment, lobbying may be regulated to protect the integrity of the
legislative process.
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In United States v. Rumely, 69 the Court considered the scope of the investigative
authority of the House of Representatives’ Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, which had
been created by the House in 1949 to examine how well the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act
of 1946 (“FRLA”) was working. The Committee was authorized inter alia to “conduct a study
and investigation of . . . all lobbying activities intended to influence, encourage, promote or
retard legislation.” As part of its investigation it sought to obtain from Rumely, the secretary of
an organization known as the Committee for Constitutional Government, records concerning the
organization’s sale “of books of a particular political tendentiousness,” particularly the names of
those who had made bulk purchases of those books for subsequent distribution. When Rumely
refused to provide the information, the House sought to hold him in contempt.
Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter expressed the concern that permitting the
Committee to inquire into “all efforts of private individuals to influence public opinion through
books and periodicals, however remote the radiations of influence which they may exert upon
the legislative process, raises doubts of constitutionality in view of the prohibition of the First
Amendment.” 70 But the Court stopped short of holding the investigation unconstitutional.
Instead, Justice Frankfurter noted that Congress had not defined “lobbying activities” in the
resolution authorizing the investigation. He concluded that in order to ”avoid a serious
constitutional doubt” about whether Congress could investigate the sale of political books to the
public the phrase “lobbying activities”” would be read to mean “lobbying in its commonly
accepted sense, that is representations made directly to Congress, its members, or its
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committees.”71 Using this narrower definition of lobbying, Justice Frankfurter determined that
Congress had not granted the Committee the authority to investigate Rumely’s organization’s
activities.72
The Court returned to the meaning of “lobbying activities,” the scope of Congressional
authority to regulate lobbying, and the role of the First Amendment the following year in United
States v. Harriss,73 which involved a prosecution brought against the National Farm Committee
and several individuals for violations of the reporting requirements of the FRLA. Specifically,
the Committee was charged with failing to report the solicitation and receipt of contributions to
influence the passage of legislation, and the individuals were charged with failing to report
expenditures for the same purpose. The expenditures included “payment of compensation to
others to communicate face-to-face with members of Congress, at public functions and
committee hearings concerning legislation” and payments “related to the costs of a campaign to
induce various interested groups and individuals to communicate by letter with members of
Congress on such legislation.” The defendants contended the statute violated the First
Amendment and that its “vague and indefinite” language violated the Due Process Clause. The
Court rejected both arguments.
Relying on Rumely, the Court interpreted the FRLA to apply only to “‘lobbying in its
commonly accepted sense’ -- to direct communication with members of Congress on pending or
proposed federal legislation. The legislative history of the Act makes clear that, at the very least,
Congress sought disclosure of such direct pressures, exerted by the lobbyists themselves or
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through their hirelings or through an artificially stimulated letter campaign.” 74 As such it
satisfied the due process requirement of definiteness without violating the freedoms guaranteed
by the First Amendment - freedom to speak, publish, and petition the Government. Chief Justice
Warren explained that the measure was justified by Congress’s legitimate interest in knowing
who is behind efforts to influence legislative action:
“Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual members of Congress
cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to which they are regularly subjected.
Yet full realization of the American ideal of government by elected representatives
depends to no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such pressures. Otherwise
the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned out by the voice of special interest
groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as proponents of the public weal. .
. .Toward that end, Congress has not sought to prohibit these pressures. It has merely
provided for a modicum of information from those who for hire attempt to influence
legislation or who collect or spend funds for that purpose. It wants only to know who is
being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much. . . .Under these circumstances,
we believe that Congress, at least within the bounds of the Act as we have construed it, is
not constitutionally forbidden to require the disclosure of lobbying activities. To do so
would be to deny Congress in large measure the power of self-protection. And here
Congress has used that power in a manner restricted to its appropriate end.”75

Harriss is significant in three respects. First, without expressly saying so, the Court
clearly indicated that lobbying is protected by the First Amendment. Although the Court
acknowledged that lobbying involves placing pressures on members of Congress -- which greatly
troubled the Court in the older contingency fee cases -- Harriss emphasized in upholding the
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FRLA that “Congress has not sought to prohibit these pressures.” 76 The limited scope of
Congress’s regulation was critical to the statute’s constitutionality.
In later cases, the Court confirmed the First Amendment’s protection of lobbying. In
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,77 for example, the Court
held that the contention that a group of businesses conspired to seek passage of legislation
beneficial to them and harmful to their competitors did not state a claim of an antitrust violation:
“[S]uch a construction of the Sherman Act would raise important constitutional questions. The
right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course,
lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.”78
Second, the Court upheld disclosure because of Congress’s interest in understanding who
is behind efforts to influence it. This carried forward Marshall’s view more than a century earlier
that a lobbyist’s failure to disclose the principal on whose behalf he acts is a form of deceit.
Strikingly, given our current sense that the purpose of disclosure is to educate the public, inform
the voters, and, thus, ultimately, advance the goal of government accountability to the people,
Harriss, like Marshall, stressed the importance of lobbying disclosure to those who are lobbied –
in this case, members of Congress – to enable them to better understand the forces behind the
lobbyists seeking to influence them. The Court also analogized lobbyist disclosure to the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act, an early federal campaign finance law, which had imposed contribution
and expenditure reporting requirements on elected officials. In adopting the FRLA, Congress
“acted in the same spirit and for a similar purpose as it did in passing the Federal Corrupt
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Practices Act -- to maintain the integrity of a basic governmental process.79 The Court’s support
for disclosure of the identities of those behind lobbying activities was confirmed more recently in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,80 in which the Court cited and quoted from
Harriss in rejecting Citizens United’s challenge to federal campaign finance disclosure
requirements, even as it sustained the organization’s attack on campaign spending limitations:
“And the Court has upheld registration and disclosure requirements on lobbyists, even
though Congress has no power to ban lobbying itself. United States v, Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,
625, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed 989 (1954) (Congress has merely provided for a modicum of
information from those who for hire attempt to influence legislation or who collect or spend
funds for that purpose).”81

Third, the Court sent mixed signals about the constitutionality of applying disclosure
requirements to money spent on efforts to persuade the public to communicate with legislators as
part of efforts to pass or block legislation -- what has come to be referred to as “grassroots
lobbying.” On the one hand, one of the charges against the Harriss defendants involved their
failure to report grassroots expenditures. In its reference to the legislative history of the FRLA,
the Court grouped grassroots activity with direct communications to members of the Congress
when it explained that “at the very least, Congress sought disclosure of such direct pressures,
exerted by the lobbyists themselves or through their hirelings or through an artificially
stimulated letter writing campaign.”82 And in a footnote the Court quoted at length from the
Senate and House reports accompanying the title of the bill that became the FRLA, which laid
out the three distinct classes of so-called lobbyists who would be subject to disclosure
requirements. The first group mentioned was
79
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“[t]hose who do not visit the Capitol but initiate propaganda from all over the country,
in the form of letters and telegrams, many of which have been based entirely upon
misinformation as to facts. This class of persons and organizations will be required under
the title, not to cease or curtail their activities in any respect, but merely to disclose the
sources of their collections and the methods in which they are disbursed.”83

On

the

other

hand,

the

Court

construed

the

Act

to

refer

only

to

“‘lobbying in its commonly accepted sense’ -- to direct communications with members of
Congress on pending or proposed federal legislation.” 84 That would appear to exclude
communications from interest groups to the public to stimulate public communications to
Congress. In so reading the Act, the Court quoted from and invoked Rumely, with its suggestion
that such a narrower reading was necessary to avoid a constitutional question.
The Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of the regulation of lobbying
per se since Harriss. However, other cases have carried forward Harriss’s main themes that
lobbying falls within the First Amendment’s protection of speech, press, and petition, but that
some regulation of lobbying is constitutional and, indeed, appropriate to maintain the integrity of
the governmental process. Lower courts have relied on Harriss in striking down state laws that
impose excessive registration fees on lobbyists and, thus, are tantamount to a tax on political
communication, but have also cited Harriss in upholding federal and state laws requiring
lobbyists to register and file periodic reports concerning their finances and activities.
Five years after Harriss, in Cammarano v. United States,85 the Court considered and
rejected the claim that a Treasury regulation denying a deduction for “ordinary and necessary”
business expenses for money spent for lobbying purposes violated the First Amendment. The
83
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Court denied that the regulation discriminated against or burdened speech: “Petitioners are not
being denied a tax deduction because they engage in constitutionally protected activities, but are
simply being required to pay for those activities entirely out of their own pockets, as everyone
else engaging in such activities is required to do.”86 Moreover, the regulation was justified by
the legitimate Congressional goal of promoting a level playing field for lobbying activity: “[I]t
appears to us to express a determination by Congress that since purchased publicity can influence
the fate of legislation which will affect, directly or indirectly, all in the community, everyone in
the community should stand on the same footing as regards its purchase so far as the Treasury of
the United States is concerned.”87
Twenty-five years after Cammarano, in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of
Washington,88 the Court also upheld against a First Amendment challenge the provision of the
Internal Revenue Code conditioning the availability of a tax deduction for contributions to
501(c)(3) charities on the requirement that “no substantial part of the activities” of the charity “is
carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation.” As in Cammarano, the
Court concluded this restriction did “not infringe[] any First Amendment rights or regulate any
First Amendment activity.” Rather, it simply reflected Congress’s decision “not to pay for”
lobbying.89
In an important concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, wrote that although the First Amendment does not require a tax subsidy for lobbying,
86
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conditioning the tax subsidy on a complete prohibition of lobbying by the benefitted organization
would be unconstitutional as it would “den[y] a significant benefit to organizations choosing to
exercise their constitutional rights.” However, because the tax code permits a 501(c)(3) charity to
establish a 501(c)(4) affiliate -- a (c)(4) is exempt from tax on its income, but contributions to the
(c)(4) are not tax-deductible to the donors -- which could engage in lobbying, the limitation on
lobbying by the 501(c)(3) is constitutional. In the view of the concurring justices, the tax code
could prevent an organization from using tax-deductible contributions for lobbying but could
limit the use for lobbying of only the tax-deductible contributions, not other funds. For them, the
First Amendment barred conditioning the tax benefit on a prohibition of all lobbying, including
lobbying financed from unsubsidized donations.90
The tax cases, thus, confirm Rumely and Harriss in finding that although laws affecting
lobbying will be viewed through the prism of the First Amendment, regulatory measures may be
sustained where they promote traditional goals like transparency and the prevention of unfairness
and do not unduly burden the core lobbying activity of legislative advocacy. 91

III. Lobbying and Campaign Participation
A. Background
A central focus of efforts to restrict the exercise of improper influence by lobbyists has
been to limit the ability of lobbyists to provide government officials with gifts or comparable
material benefits such as honoraria for speeches or complementary travel, meals, or
90
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entertainment. The scope of these restrictions varies considerably and states and local
governments continue to revise and extend these rules.92 But elected officials may be at least as
grateful for donations to or other forms of active support for their election campaigns as for
tickets to the Super Bowl or golfing trips. As Professor Luneburg has observed, “lobbyist
assistance in political fundraising is a matter of intense interest today.”93 Thomas Susman has
pointed out that lobbyists are actively involved in electoral campaigns through “writing checks,
hosting or attending fundraisers, delivering bundled checks, or acting as treasurer of a reelection
committee.” As a result, “lobbyists [are] a principal source of fundraising for candidates.”94 This
carries the potential (some would say danger) of triggering reciprocal favors by the officeholder.
Although Dean Nicholas Allard has suggested that the role of campaign contributions in
lobbying has been overstated, he also agrees that it would be “unrealistic to dismiss the role of
campaign contributions on the lobbying process.” Moreover, he notes that as laws and
regulations restrict or prohibit lobbyists from giving gifts to legislators or paying for their meals
or entertainment, the salience of campaign contributions and other forms of campaign
participation as a means for lobbyists to influence officials has grown:
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“By prohibiting and restricting a wide array of activities and contacts involving lobbyists
that are, in most cases, still permitted if related to fundraising activities, the new rules
enhance the already too important impact of fundraising on the political process, thus
increasing the risk of the perception, if not the reality, of impropriety. For example, under
the [new federal] rules, a lobbyist may not buy a Congressman a meal at a restaurant
unless he and perhaps other guests also hand over checks as campaign contributions.”95
Indeed, as the New York Times recently found, the campaign finance “loophole allows
lawmakers to reel in trips and donations” through “destination fund-raisers, where business
interests blend with pleasure in exclusive vacation venues.”96 Public interest organizations have
also given extensive attention to the campaign finance practices of lobbyists as donors, bundlers,
and fundraisers. The 2011 report of the ABA’s Task Force on Federal Lobbying Laws made
several recommendations for the “separation of lobbying and campaign participation.”97
The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA)98 -- the most
recent major revision of federal lobbying law -- addressed the campaign finance practices of
lobbyists. HLOGA requires federal candidate campaign committees, political party committees,
and leadership PACs to disclose the bundled contributions received from federally registered
lobbyists that are in excess of $15,000 in a six-month period.99 Bundled contribution are those
that have been collected by an individual and forwarded -- “in a bundle” -- to a political
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committee of campaign in such a way that the person collecting and forwarding the funds is
credited by the recipient with raising the money.100
Many states go much further than disclosure and impose substantive limitations on
lobbyists’ campaign finance activities. Nearly a dozen states prohibit lobbyists from making and legislators, state elected officials, and candidates for state office from accepting - campaign
contributions while the legislature is in session.101 Another five states flatly ban contributions by
lobbyists to some categories of elected officials or candidates for elective office, such as those
holding or seeking offices the lobbyist has registered to lobby. 102 Some impose a lower donation
limit on lobbyists’ contributions to candidates or political committees than would apply to other
donors.103 North Carolina not only bans lobbyists from contributing to legislators and other
public officials but also bars lobbyists from engaging in bundling; 104 Maryland prohibits
regulated lobbyists from fundraising for candidates, including soliciting or transmitting
contributions, sitting on a fundraising committee, or serving as a campaign treasurer.105 Other
state laws have been more modest, requiring only that lobbyists disclose their campaign
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contributions or their bundled contributions in their lobbying reports.106 Unsurprisingly, many of
these restrictions have drawn constitutional challenges.
B. The Evolving Case Law
The most common state provision aimed at lobbyists’ campaign finance participation,
and the one most frequently challenged is the ban on lobbyist contributions while the legislature
is in session. These have drawn a mixed judicial reaction, with such bans struck down by state or
federal district courts in Alaska, 107 Arkansas, 108 Florida, 109 and Missouri. 110 In addition, a
federal district court in Tennessee invalidated the application of that state’s ban on lobbyist
contributions during the legislative session to non-incumbent candidates for office, albeit without
addressing whether the ban could constitutionally be applied to incumbents.111 On the other
hand, two courts -- the Vermont Supreme Court112 and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit
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-- upheld session contribution bans.

The courts invalidating the bans found them to be overinclusive in barring even small
contributions; in applying to contributions to elected statewide officials who were not part of the
legislative process; or in applying to contributions to nonincumbents.114 Some bans have also
been found to be underinclusive because they target contributions only during the legislative
session or shortly thereafter, thus failing “to recognize that corruption can occur anytime, even
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outside the banned time period.”115 By taking a potentially large chunk of the year out of the
fundraising process, the bans were said to help incumbents, as challengers would have less time
to overcome the built-in advantages incumbents enjoy.116 Moreover, given the possibility of
“unusually long” or extra legislative sessions, a session fundraising ban can be a significant
burden on fundraising activity.117
The Fourth Circuit in North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett undertook the most
substantial treatment of the constitutional question posed by a session contribution ban. Chief
Judge Wilkinson applied strict judicial scrutiny to the contribution restriction but still found it
justified by the compelling state interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption:
“With respect to actual corruption, lobbyists are paid to effectuate particular political
outcomes. The pressure on them mounts as legislation winds its way through the system.
If lobbyists are free to contribute to legislators while pet projects sit before them, the
temptation to exchange ‘dollars for political favors’ can be powerful. . . . While lobbyists
do much to inform the legislative process, and their participation is in the main both
constructive and honest, there remain powerful hydraulic pressures at play which can
cause both legislators and lobbyists to cross the line. State governments need not await
the onset of scandal before taking action.
The appearance of corruption resulting from . . . lobbyist contributions during the
legislative session can also be corrosive. Even if lobbyists have no intention of directly
‘purchasing= favorable treatment, appearances may be otherwise. The First Amendment
does not prevent states such as North Carolina from recognizing these dangers and taking
reasonable steps to ensure that the appearance of corruption does not undermine public
confidence in the integrity of representative democracy.”118
Chief Judge Wilkinson also found the restriction to be narrowly tailored, as the legislative
session typically, although not invariably, runs just a few months in an election year and is also
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the period “during which the risk of an actual quid pro quo or the appearance of one runs
highest.”119
Broader bans on lobbyists’ campaign contributions have also drawn constitutional
challenges, with similarly mixed results.120 In 1979, the California Supreme Court struck down a
complete prohibition on lobbyists’ campaign contributions, adopted by voter initiative in 1974.
The court found the ban to be fatally overbroad because it applied to donations “to any and all
candidates even though the lobbyist may never have occasion to lobby the candidate.” The court
also noted that by applying to small as well as large contributions the ban was not “narrowly
directed to the aspects of political association where potential corruption might be identified.”121
Two decades later a federal district court upheld a more tightly focused ban, adopted by
California voters in 2001, which prohibits lobbyists from making contributions only to those
candidates running for the offices the lobbyist has registered to lobby.122 The Alaska Supreme
Court sustained a somewhat broader ban on contributions by lobbyists to candidates in
legislative districts outside the district in which the lobbyist is eligible to vote.123
Both the Alaska and more recent California court decisions emphasized the dangers
posed by lobbyists’ contributions while minimizing the burden the restrictions placed on
lobbyists’ constitutional rights. The Alaska court found that lobbyist contributions “create special
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risks of actual or apparent corruption because of the lobbyist’s special role in the legislative
system.”124 The lobbyist’s incentive to make contributions to large numbers of legislators who
are “in position to introduce or thwart legislation and to vote in committees or on the floor on
matters of professional interest to the lobbyist . . . creates a very real perception of
interest-buying.”125 In language echoing the nineteenth and early twentieth century contingent
fee cases, the California court emphasized that lobbyists’ contributions present a special danger
of corruption because their “continued employment depends on their success in influencing
legislative action.”126 These courts found that the restrictions were narrowly tailored to focus on
the danger of undue influence without burdening lobbyists’ rights because they did not limit the
ability of lobbyists to undertake independent expenditures, contribute to political parties, or
volunteer on behalf of legislative campaigns.127
In 2010 and 2011, two federal appeals courts divided over the constitutionality of state
laws banning campaign contributions by lobbyists. In Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield,128
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit invalidated a Connecticut law
prohibiting lobbyists and their family members from contributing to any statewide or state
legislative candidate, a legislative caucus or leadership committee, or a party committee, and
from soliciting contributions for such candidates or committees. The court emphasized that a
complete ban, as opposed to a tight limit on, campaign contributions imposed a serious burden
on First Amendment rights. Writing for the court, Judge Cabranes acknowledged the contention
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that lobbyists receive special attention from elected officials, but denied there was anything
improper about that:
“Influence and access, moreover, are not sinister in nature. Some influence, such as wise
counsel from a trusted advisor - even a lobbyist - can enhance the effectiveness of our
representative government.”129
Earlier in the same opinion, the court had upheld Connecticut’s flat prohibition on campaign
contributions by government contractors, finding the contractor ban justified because recent
Connecticut scandals involving corrupt dealings between contractors and government officials
created an appearance of corruption with respect to all exchanges of money between state
contractors and candidates for state office.130 But “the recent corruption scandals had nothing to
do with lobbyists”131 so a comparable blanket ban on contributions by lobbyists could not be
justified. The court also found that the solicitation ban was not narrowly tailored to preventing
the kind of improper influence that might result from the bundling of contributions; however, the
court suggested that “a less restrictive alternative” focused on large-scale bundling might pass
constitutional muster.132 The following year, a different Second Circuit panel in Ognibene v.
Parkes133 upheld a New York City law sharply lowering the permissible limits on contributions
by lobbyists and persons and firms doing business with the City to candidates for municipal
office. Ognibene relied on Green Party’s differentiation between a ban and a limit to distinguish
the earlier case.
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In contrast to the Second Circuit’s Green Party decision, the Fourth Circuit in Preston v.
Leake134 in 2011 upheld North Carolina’s total ban on lobbyist contributions against both a
facial attack and an “as-applied” claim by the plaintiff lobbyist that her stated desire to make
only $25 contributions to her favorite candidates did not raise any danger of corruption. Writing
for the court, Judge Niemeyer reached the conclusion, directly opposed to that of Judge Cabranes
and the Second Circuit panel, that “experience has taught” that “lobbyists are especially
susceptible to political corruption.”
“The role of a lobbyist is both legitimate and important to legislation and government
decision-making, but by its very nature, it is prone to corruption and therefore especially
susceptible to public suspicion of corruption. Any payment made by a lobbyist to a public
official, whether a campaign contribution or simply a gift, calls into the question the
propriety of the relationship, and therefore North Carolina could rationally adjudge that it
should ban all payments.”135
Preston emphasized the limited scope of the ban, which applied only to lobbyists’
contributions to candidates, and did not preclude lobbyists from canvassing for or donating time
to a candidate.136 Moreover, unlike the situation in Connecticut, lobbyists had been part of the
political corruption scandals which had led North Carolina to enact the campaign contributions
prohibition in 2006137 so the “legislature thus made the rational judgment that a complete ban
was necessary as a prophylactic to prevent not only actual corruption but also the appearance of
corruption in future state political campaigns.”138
Courts have also addressed a handful of other restrictions on the campaign finance
practices of lobbyists. A federal district court in Wisconsin held that the portion of the state law
134
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prohibiting lobbyists from furnishing to any agency official, legislative employee of the state, or
any candidate for state elective office “any . . . thing of pecuniary value” was unconstitutional to
the extent that, as interpreted by the state ethics board, the regulation prohibited lobbyists from
volunteering personal services to political campaigns. The court recognized that Wisconsin’s
lobby law reflects the legislature’s judgment that, as a class, lobbyists have greater potential to
corrupt the political process than do ordinary citizens but the court found that the ethics board
had failed to show any basis “for finding that volunteering by lobbyists threatens the integrity of
the political process any more than volunteering by other citizens, such as environmental
activists, insurance executives, or lawyers, whose volunteering is altogether unregulated.”139 On
the other hand, a federal district court in Maryland upheld the provisions of that state’s law
prohibiting a lobbyist from serving as a campaign treasurer for a candidate or elected official,
serving on a candidate’s fundraising committee, or organizing or establishing a political
committee for the purpose of soliciting or transmitting contributions. The court sustained these
provisions with little discussion, noting simply that those relationships posed a danger of
corruption and that the Maryland legislature had acted after “an actual influence peddling
scandal” involving a lobbyist.140
C. Regulating the Campaign Finance-Lobbying Relationship
The increased interpenetration of lobbying law and campaign finance regulation is hardly
surprising. Like the gifts, honoraria, and entertainment that lobbyists have long sought to provide
to public officials, campaign financial support provides valuable private benefits that build social
139
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relationships, cements good will, and may create a predisposition on the part of the elected
beneficiaries to reciprocate by giving special access, or even taking official actions helpful, to
their lobbyist benefactors.141 Given the premium elected officials place on staying in office or
reaching for higher office, campaign finance support may be an even more successful means for
lobbyists to ingratiate themselves with officeholders than free meals and entertainment.
But restrictions on lobbyists’ campaign finance activities raise constitutional questions
not posed by prohibitions on tickets to the Super Bowl or plane tickets for golfing in Scotland.
Gifts and free meals are not forms of political speech and association, they do not help finance
political speech, and they play no positive role in the electoral system. They are tools for
influence peddling and nothing more. By contrast, campaign contributions, the solicitation of
donations, and other forms of campaign participation are constitutionally protected. In the
absence of full public funding for candidates and political parties, private campaign contributions
are essential to the functioning of our electoral system. Candidates, political parties, and other
political groups are dependent on donations to pay for their ability to bring facts, arguments, and
policy ideas to the voters. Campaign contributions are also a form of political expression and
association by donors. To be sure, campaign contributions can be limited in amount, and
donations from certain sources may be restricted. But the constitutional protection accorded
giving and soliciting campaign funds means that special restrictions on lobbyists’ campaign
contributions present questions not raised by comparable restrictions on gifts, honoraria, and free
meals and entertainment.

141

See, e.g., Lipton, Loophole Allows Lawmakers to Reel in Trips, supra (“ ‘An informal setting is an effective
way to build a better relationship,’ said a health care lobbyist who attended the fund-raising weekend in Vail this
month.”).

39

The least intrusive form of lobbying regulation, and the one most likely to pass
constitutional muster, is disclosure. The Supreme Court has upheld disclosure requirements in
both the campaign finance 142 and lobbying contexts. With lobbyists already subject to
registration and reporting requirements, it would not be a much greater burden to also require
them to detail their campaign finance activities -- contributions over a dollar threshold, bundling
over a dollar threshold, fundraising, or service as a campaign treasurer or fundraiser -- in their
periodic reports. Although some of this might overlap with reports filed by candidates
concerning contributions or staff, it would still be useful for public transparency and voter
information to combine lobbying and campaign contribution information in a single place in a
form which is filed electronically, downloadable, and searchable.
Going beyond disclosure and specially restricting lobbyists’ campaign contributions,
whether by subjecting them to tighter limits than those that apply to other donors or barring them
from making contributions altogether, presents a more difficult question: Are lobbyists’
contributions particularly likely to be sources of the corruption and the appearance of corruption
that the Supreme Court has determined is the only constitutionally permissible basis for limiting
campaign finance activity? Some courts have been willing to defer to legislative judgments that
contributions from lobbyists pose a special risk of improperly influencing government because of
lobbyists’ regular and extended engagement with the legislative process, their ongoing close
contacts with government officials, their inside knowledge, and the financial rewards they obtain
from their relationships with officials and other government decision-makers. Other courts,
however, have indicated that they do not see lobbyists as necessarily posing any greater dangers
than anyone else making campaign contributions, so that tighter restrictions would require more
142
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specific evidence of lobbyists’ involvement in corrupt activities. The disagreement between the
Second and Fourth Circuits on this question brings to mind the older judicial debate over
whether lobbying is inherently corrupting or whether there has to be some specific showing of
misconduct before a lobbying contingency fee could be declared unenforceable.
This issue is intertwined with the question of what ought to be considered improper or
undue influence. In McConnell v FEC, the Supreme Court upheld restrictions on soft money
contributions to the political parties because Congress had demonstrated that such contributions
were given in order to win their donors preferential access, which it treated as a species of
corruption. In language suggestive of the nineteenth and early twentieth century courts’ concern
about the threat to self-government posed by “personal influence” and private solicitations,
McConnell observed:
“Our cases have firmly established that Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond
preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing undue influence on an
officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence. . . . Many of the deeply
disturbing examples of such corruption cited by this Court in Buckley . . . to justify
FECA’s contribution limits were not episodes of vote buying, but evidence that various
corporate interests had given substantial donations to gain access to high-level
government officials. . . . Even if that access did not secure actual influence, it certainly
gave the appearance of such influence.”143
By contrast, Citizens United was sharply critical of the use of “generic favoritism or influence
theory” to determine what constitutes improper influence. The Court narrowed the definition of
what constitutes corruption, declaring “ingratiation and access, in any event, are not corruption”
and urging that the “influence over and access to elected officials” that may follow from the use
of campaign money does not mean those officials have been corrupted.144 To be sure, Citizens
143
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United

involved spending limits,

not

contributions,

but the decision compounds the

uncertainty as to just what must be shown about the impact of lobbyist contributions or
fundraising to justify their special restriction.
Arguably, special rules for lobbyist donations are misdirected or underinclusive.
Lobbyists are advocates for the legislative or regulatory goals of clients. While lobbyists may
have special knowledge of the state of legislative developments and special incentives to get
contributions to strategically significant legislators at specific times in order to advance a
particular measure, it is a client’s interest they are advancing. As such, it is not clear why
lobbyists’ contributions present a greater risk of corruption than the contributions from the firms,
organizations, associations or individuals they represent. Some jurisdictions have recognized that
lobbyists, or lobbyists alone, do not present special dangers of corruption by imposing special
restrictions more broadly. Sixteen states ban all contributions during the legislative session, not
just those from lobbyists.145 Many states have adopted so-called “pay-to-play” laws limiting or
barring donations by government contractors, 146 or limiting or restricting donations by
businesses in certain highly regulated fields, like gambling147 or the sale of alcohol.148 Federal
law has long imposed a complete ban on campaign contributions by federal contractors in
connection with federal elections.149 New York City may have adopted the most comprehensive
approach, imposing very low donation limits on both lobbyists and a broad category of firms and
individuals defined as “doing business” with the City, as well making donations from those
145
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groups ineligible for public matching funds under the City’s public funding program.150 These
restrictions were upheld by the Second Circuit in Ognibene v. Parkes.
On the other hand, many experts with first-hand experience of the role of campaign
contributions are convinced that there is something particularly toxic about the interaction of
lobbying and campaign finance. If successful interest-group representation turns on building
relationships with officials in order to get access, and lobbyists are in the business of building
those relationships, then lobbyists – or at least the most successful lobbyists -- may be
particularly adept at using campaign contributions to advance legislative ends. “At the very least,
fundraisers are also an opportunity to check in, to get face time, and to build relationships.”151
Recent political science work indicates that for contract lobbyists -- that is, lobbyists hired by a
variety of clients, rather than in-house lobbyists who work for a specific employer -- campaign
contributions are a significant means of sustaining relationships with legislators and a marker of
professional success.152 A relatively small fraction of lobbyists account for most of lobbyists’
contributions.

A survey by Public Citizen found that from 1998 through 2005 only one-quarter

of federally registered lobbyists actually made campaign contributions in excess of $200 to a
single congressional candidate or PAC, but that 6% of all lobbyists accounted for 83% of all
lobbyists’ campaign contributions, and that these superdonors were also major bundlers.153
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Moreover, while it might make sense to apply the notion of special influence beyond lobbyists to
include contractors or others doing business with government, it ought not be fatally
underinclusive for a government to take the more limited step of focusing on the corruption and
appearance of corruption concern posed by the campaign activity of those whose business it is to
influence government action.
Even if lobbyists are not necessarily a group more likely to convert campaign support
into undue influence, recent evidence of government corruption involving lobbyists in a specific
jurisdiction, as in North Carolina, can provide support for tighter restrictions on lobbyists in that
jurisdiction. On the other hand, as the Connecticut example suggests, the absence of recent local
scandals involving lobbyists may be a reason for finding that more stringent laws impose an
unjustified burden on First Amendment rights.
The specific restriction in question also matters. As Ognibene’s distinguishing of Green
Party demonstrates, lower contribution limits pose less constitutional difficulty than sweeping
contribution bans. Concerns about improper and unfair influence would also be particularly
well-served by restrictions that focus on the nature of the relationship a campaign finance
activity establishes between the lobbyist and the candidate, and the likelihood that the campaign
support will be reciprocated through influence on official action. An individual campaign
contribution -- which in most jurisdictions is subject to a dollar limit -- is unlikely to have a
major effect on an officeholder. People active in the legislative process regularly make
contributions not because they particularly support the candidates to whom they are donating but
because it has become a precondition for lobbying practice. Making a campaign contribution is
often considered a cost of doing legislative business, and it is not uncommon for a donor to give
http://www.citizen.org/documents/BankrollersFinal.pdf.
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to both parties and competing candidates in the same election.154 Such a campaign contribution
may have a positive impact on a relationship with an elected official – as well as avoiding a
negative implication from not having made a contribution – but the impact may not be great. On
the other hand, direct involvement in a candidate’s campaign – such as by serving as a treasurer
or on the finance committee -- suggests real personal support which may be more likely to be
recognized and honored by an officeholder. Campaign activities which involve a distinct
personal role for the lobbyist may tend to forge a link between the lobbyist and the candidate
which subsequently gives the lobbyist extra influence. As a result, restrictions on such a
campaign role may be justified. Bundling arguably falls between these extremes. Although
bundling or other forms of fundraising may be less of a commitment than service as a campaign
treasurer or other officer, bundling or fundraising over a threshold level can represent a more
significant level of support for a candidate than merely making a personal contribution. There
might, thus, be a good case to prohibit lobbyists from bundling for candidates running for office
an office the lobbyist lobbies or limiting how much a lobbyist may bundle.
IV. Substantive Regulation on Lobbying: Contingent Fees and the Revolving Door
A. Contingent Fees
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General federal lobbying regulations do not restrict the use of contingent fees in the
compensation of lobbyists,156 but forty-three states prohibit the practice and a forty-fourth
restricts it.157 As noted in Part II, courts have long treated contingent fee arrangements for
lobbyists as void for public policy on the theory that they create an incentive for lobbyists to use
improper means to influence government action. Some modern court decisions continue to
support restrictions on contingent fees. Within the last two dozen years, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court of Kentucky have rejected facial
challenges to state laws banning the payment of contingent fees to lobbyists; a Florida state court
found a lobbyist contingent fee arrangement to be void for public policy; and Maryland’s highest
court permitted an enforcement action by the state ethics board to go forward against a lobbyist
who inserted a contingent fee provision in his contract, although the court split over a procedural
question in the case.158 On the other hand, in a case decided in the 1980s, the Montana Supreme
Court concluded that a “blanket prohibition against contingent compensation of lobbyists” is
unconstitutionally overbroad and “infringes the rights of those who, while contemplating neither
illegal nor unethical conduct, need or desire to employ a lobbyist on a contingent fee basis in
order to advance their interests before a public official.”159
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Modern First Amendment doctrine poses difficulties for a ban on contingent fee
lobbying. In Meyer v. Grant160 the Supreme Court invalidated under the First Amendment a
Colorado law banning payments to people who circulated the petitions used to gather signatures
to place an initiative question on the ballot. Barring the use of paid circulators reduced the
number of people willing to carry petitions and the number of people they could reach with their
message, thereby making it more difficult to qualify initiatives for the ballot. The Court held that
the restriction could not be justified by the state’s interest in assuring that an initiative has
sufficient grass roots support to be placed on the ballot or - more pertinent to the contingent fee
for lobbying question - its interest in protecting the integrity of the initiative process. The former
interest was held to be adequately protected by the signature requirement itself, while the latter
was held to be adequately addressed by laws criminalizing the forging of petition signatures,
making false or misleading statements to obtain a signature, or paying someone to sign a
petition.161 Similarly, in a series of cases involving charitable solicitations, the Court struck
down state laws limiting the percentage of charitable donations collected that could be used to
defray solicitation costs or pay professional fundraisers. 162 Limiting the expenditure of funds
used to solicit funding was treated as a limitation on the speech involved in solicitation. The
principal justification offered by the states in these cases was the prevention of fraud, but the
Court emphasized that the anti-fraud goal could be attained by laws targeting fraud itself or
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requiring charities to file financial disclosure reports, so that the limits on compensation were not
narrowly tailored to the fraud-prevention interest.
To the extent that a prohibition on contingent fee compensation makes it more difficult
for some individuals or groups to hire a lobbyist or reduces communications made by lobbyists
to government officials on their behalf, a prohibition on contingent fees infringes on First
Amendment rights. The principal justification traditionally given for the restriction is that by
tying compensation to success contingent fees create an incentive for a lobbyist to use improper
or corrupt means, but the comparable anti-fraud argument has not fared well in the petition
circulation and charitable solicitation contexts, where the Court’s response has been that limits
on compensation are overbroad and anti-fraud laws can do the job. To be sure, the Court in the
campaign finance cases has held that Congress and the states can use campaign contribution
restrictions to address concerns about corruption and the appearance of corruption that fall short
of outright bribery or the payment of illegal gratuities, but contribution restrictions (and gift
restrictions) apply directly to interactions with elected officials, whereas contingent fee
prohibitions apply only to private contracts (although they reflect a concern about the ultimate
impact of such fee arrangements on public actions). The contingent fees themselves, thus, do not
literally involve the corruption of government officials. The claim, rather, is the more attenuated
one that they create an incentive to lobbyists to take actions that improperly influence the
officials they lobby. Still, given the extensive body of older Supreme Court case law invalidating
lobbyist contingent fees, lower courts have been reluctant to strike down prohibitions on

48

contingent fees in the absence of a modern Supreme Court case applying the First Amendment to
such contingency fee arrangements.163
Even apart from the constitutional question, the case for regulating lobbying contingent
fees is uncertain. Contingent fees are regularly used in the hiring of counsel and have proven to
be a means of enabling the less affluent to obtain representation for their interests. As the ABA
Task Force Report noted “[t]he opportunity to resort to a contingency fee contract may enable
some private persons to obtain representation that they could not otherwise afford. . . . In this
regard, contingency fee arrangements may promote norms of equal access to justice.”164 It is not
clear if any empirical work has been done concerning whether contingent fees are either useful in
obtaining lobbying representation or in fueling misconduct.
Permitting contingency fees, but requiring disclosure 165 of such arrangements -- as
provided by a handful of states -- would surely pass constitutional muster. Adding such a
requirement to existing disclosure laws would place little new burden on those required to
register and report, and would be unlikely to curtail the availability of representation. Disclosure
would also provide useful information concerning how widespread contingent fee arrangements
are; how large the payments are; what types of clients use them; whether this arrangement
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actually makes representation more available to less affluent interests and organizations; and
whether there is any correlation between contingent fees and misconduct.
B. Revolving Door Restrictions
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As one scholar has put it, “[p]erhaps no problem in government ethics is easier to
understand or more difficult to address effectively, than that posed by revolving-door
employment,” 167 that is, the hiring as lobbyists of former government officials upon their
leaving public office. “Lobbying and other advocacy groups seek out former members [of
Congress] in order to gain an advantage over the opposition.”168 “The risk is obvious that a
client represented by a public-servant-turned-lobbyist will have, or will appear to have, an unfair
advantage in petitioning the government.”169
This unfair advantage can take many forms. “A former lawmaker may know about a
Senator’s family or a House member’s parochial concerns, insights that help advocates make
quick personal connections while pressing a policy position. They also have better prospects for
getting a private meeting with their former Senate or House colleagues.”170 As former Solicitor
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General and Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox put it, “the ex-official lobbyist comes
as a friend, an insider.”171 Sometimes, the ex-official may literally have better physical access, if,
for example, a legislature continues to give former members special access to legislative
facilities. So, too, as Cox explained, “the ex-official will often be able to trade upon habits of
deferring to his advice and wishes engendered during the days when he was senior to, or at least
a more influential official than those with whom he now deals in a different capacity.”
Sometimes the ex-official will have special knowledge or inside information about the matter
subject to potential government action which will give her an edge over other lobbyists. Beyond
the possibility of unfairness to other interests seeking government action, the potential for
post-public-service employment as a lobbyist may affect the decisions of government officials
while in office, who may be “tempted to curry favor with prospective employers or clients.”172
As a result, Congress, many state legislatures, and a number of cities have adopted
“revolving door” rules or “cooling off” periods limiting for a time the ability of former
government officials to lobby the government offices where they were once employed.173 The
Senate’s revolving door rule played a role in the scandal that led to the 2011 resignation of
Senator John Ensign (R-Nev). Ensign was having an affair with the wife of his administrative
assistant, Doug Hampton. When Hampton found out, Ensign helped Hampton establish himself
as a lobbyist by finding him clients. Hampton then contacted Ensign’s office on behalf of those
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clients in violation of the anti-revolving door rule, and was eventually indicted for violating the
revolving door prohibition.174
The content of these restrictions vary significantly with respect to who is restricted;
which offices, agencies, or branches of government they are restricted from lobbying; and how
long and with respect to what matters the restriction applies. The most consistently accepted
principles are (i) that former members of government should not be allowed to lobby with
respect to matters with which they were personally and substantially involved as government
employees, and (ii) that former government officers should not be able to lobby the particular
offices or agencies where they were employed for a specific, limited period of time, typically one
or two years. At the federal level, revolving door restrictions were initially aimed at members of
the executive branch under the 1978 Ethics in Government Act, and the rules governing former
executive branch officials vary considerably according to the level of the former official’s
employment, the subject matter of his or her public service, and the nature of the representation
in question. Congress began to regulate lobbying by former members of Congress and their staffs
in the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, which also strengthened the limits on former members of the
executive branch. HLOGA adopted or extended a number of revolving door restrictions so that
former Senators are now barred from lobbying Congress for two years after leaving office and
former members of the House of Representatives are barred from lobbying Congress for one year
after leaving office. Higher-paid congressional staffers, including both staff to members of
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Congress and staff to committees, leadership, and legislative offices are subject to a one-year
restriction on lobbying the offices or committees where they had been employed.175
Revolving door restrictions have been questioned as both too restrictive and not
restrictive enough. On the one hand, they constrain the employment opportunities of former
government officials as well as limit the ability of private individuals and groups to retain as
lobbyists individuals who may be uniquely well-informed about their issues and well-qualified to
represent them. This could discourage some capable people from government service,
particularly legislative staff members who do not enjoy civil service protections and whose jobs
are subject to unpredictable political changes. The exclusion of former legislators and staffers
knowledgeable about both the policy content of and legislative process for important issues is
also a cost. On the other hand, many existing revolving door restrictions are weak. The typical
one-year rule may not be long enough to curb unfair influence. Moreover, former members of
Congress have demonstrated they can escape revolving door restrictions by avoiding the direct
contacts with the legislature necessary to fall within the statutory definition of lobbying and
instead providing “strategic consulting” services to clients. Former Senator Christopher Dodd
demonstrated this when he became chairman and chief executive for the Motion Picture
Association of America; -- in other words, Hollywood’s top lobbyist,-- less than three months
after leaving office, despite the Senate’s two-year revolving door rule. As Senator Dodd
explained, he saw his job “as an architect of legislative strategy.” “There are other people here
who do that,” he said of direct lobbying efforts.176
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There is relatively little case law dealing with revolving door restrictions, perhaps
because they have generally been considered constitutionally unproblematic. An early Seventh
Circuit decision rejected a due process challenge to the federal criminal law provision barring a
former government official from representing a client before the government with respect to a
matter in which the former official had been substantially involved while in government, finding
that the “statute proscribes as precisely as possible an unethical practice that can manifest itself
in infinite forms.”177 Similarly, an Ohio court upheld that state’s one-year revolving door rule, at
that time aimed only at executive branch personnel, finding the “state has a substantial and
compelling interest to restrict unethical practices of its employees and public officials not only
for the internal integrity of the administration of government, but also for the purpose of
maintaining public confidence in state and local government.”178 A more recent federal district
court decision in Ohio treated revolving door laws as creating a more serious constitutional issue.
Brinkman v. Budish179 enjoined the enforcement of Ohio’s revolving door law, which had been
expanded to bar former members of the state legislature and former legislative employees from
representing any person on any matter before the legislature or legislative committees for a
period of one year after the conclusion of the member or employee’s legislative service.
Brinkman involved a former legislator who was also a member of an anti-tax advocacy
organization and sought to represent that organization, on an uncompensated basis, before the
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legislature within the statutory one-year period. Finding that the revolving door rule burdened the
organization’s right to retain a representative of its choosing, the court subjected the law to strict
judicial scrutiny. The court agreed that the goals of preventing unethical practices of public
employees and public officials, and promoting, maintaining, and bolstering the public’s
confidence in the integrity of state government are compelling government interests, but held,
without explanation, that they are not compelling with respect to uncompensated lobbying.180 A
third interest advanced by the government -- “to prevent unequal access to the General Assembly
by outside organizations by virtue of any significant relationships with current and former public
officials who may be in a position to influence government policy”-- was held not to be a
compelling interest at all.181 The court reasoned that Citizens United’s rejection of the idea “that
political corruption necessarily follows from the fact that a speaker may be favored or have
special access to elected officials” eliminates the prevention-of-unfair-access justification for
revolving door laws.182
Brinkman’s assertion that Citizens United precludes the unequal special access
justification for revolving door laws is unpersuasive. Revolving door laws are much more tightly
limited than the spending ban at issue on Citizens United. The “cooling off” period requirement
targets only communications by former government officials to current government officials for
a limited time or with respect to a limited set of matters. The former official is free to speak
about government matters to the public, or when not seeking to influence legislative action,
during the revolving door period and entirely free thereafter. So, too, the burden on the
individuals and organizations that would retain ex-officials as advocates is light. They are free to
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hire anyone other than a recent ex-official to represent them to the legislature, and to hire anyone
they want to communicate their views to the public about matters before the legislature. The
burden on political expression is, thus, quite modest – probably less than that posed by
contingent fee restrictions, which may make counsel entirely unavailable to less affluent clients.
The prevention of unequal access based on prior government service is an appropriate regulatory
goal consistent with the longstanding purposes of lobbying laws to promote public-regarding
government decisions and public confidence in government. Indeed, the essence of the
nineteenth and early twentieth century anti-lobbying decisions – the reliance on personal
importunities, private solicitation, and the use of inside knowledge – is at the heart of the
rationale for the revolving door ban, and would apply even to uncompensated lobbying.
Despite its result, Brinkman recognizes that revolving door laws are justified by
traditional concerns about government ethics and public confidence in government. Certainly,
the narrower rules prohibiting representations with respect to specific matters in which the
official was involved

are grounded in traditional conflict of interest principles barring

representatives from switching sides in the same case. Brinkman is a useful reminder that
lobbying restrictions generally trigger First Amendment review and that there may be a First
Amendment outer limit to revolving door restrictions but that most revolving door restrictions
are likely to pass muster. The court, however, erred in its unjustified extrapolation from Citizens
United and its resulting unduly narrow definition of the public interests that can justify limited
lobbying regulation.
A recent development in this area has been the emergence of “reverse revolving door”
rules limiting the hiring of lobbyists into government positions. At the start of his administration,
President Obama issued an executive order barring – subject to waivers -- the hiring of a lobbyist
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for a position in an agency the lobbyist had lobbied in the preceding two years and requiring any
former lobbyist to recuse himself for two years from participating in any matters or policy areas
in which the lobbyist had participated in the two years prior to the executive branch
appointment. 183 Thereafter the White House issued a memorandum directing the heads of
executive departments and agencies not to appoint federally registered lobbyists to serve on
advisory boards and committees.184
It is difficult to see the case for a blanket ban on the reverse revolving door appointment
of lobbyists to full-time positions. Presumably, the appointee’s prior service as a lobbyist would
be known to both those making the appointment and to the Senate if the position requires Senate
confirmation. If the knowledge, experience, and perspective the person brings to the position is
attractive, it is hard to see why prior service as a lobbyist should be disqualifying per se,
although closeness to a particular organization, industry, or special interest group might be a
factor taken into account in the decision to appoint or confirm.185 If the concern is that the
appointee would subsequently exploit the position when he or she leaves the government that
could be addressed by the traditional revolving door rule.
On the other hand, requiring former lobbyists to recuse themselves from specific matters
on which they had lobbied is completely appropriate as the prospect of a conflict of interest in
that situation is very real. So, too, restrictions on the appointment of lobbyists to part-time
positions makes some sense as there could be a legitimate concern that a lobbyist who
simultaneously holds high government office might have an unfair advantage in seeking to
183

Executive Order 13490 (Jan. 21, 2009).
See U.S. General Services Administration, Registered Lobbyists Serving on Advisory Committees, June 24,
2010.
185
See, e.g, Timothy B. Lee, “Lobbyists becoming public officials isn’t as bad as the other way around,”
Washington Post, June 20, 2013.
184

57

influence government action. On the other hand, some advisory bodies are structured to permit
representation of industries, organizations, or interest groups affected by the recommendations or
decisions of those bodies. Moreover, as with the question of special limits on campaign
contributions it is debatable whether the problem of improper special interest influence is more
acute for lobbyists than for other individuals whose private sector positions give them a stake in
government actions. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
noted these issues when it reversed a lower court’s dismissal of a challenge by federally
registered lobbyists who were interested in being appointed to the Industry Trade Advisory
Committees (“ITACs”) authorized by the Trade Act of 1974 to President Obama’s executive
order barring registered lobbyists from serving on a wide range of advisory boards and
commissions, including the ITACs. Emphasizing that “registered lobbyists are protected by the
First Amendment right to petition,” the court found the plaintiffs “plausibly alleged that the ban
pressures them to limit their constitutional right” and so “pled a viable First Amendment
unconstitutional conditions claim.”186 As the court explained, the ITACs were created “for the
very purpose of reflecting the viewpoints of private industry.”187 Remanding without passing
expressly on the merits of the claim, the court noted the government’s argument that the ban was
intended to change the “culture of special-interest access,” but observed skeptically that ITAC
members are intended to “serve in a representative capacity,” and then directed the district court
on remand to “ask the parties to focus on the justification for distinguishing . . . between
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corporate employees (who may represent their employers on ITACs) and the registered lobbyists
those same corporations retain (who may not).188
V. Disclosure
Disclosure laws generally require lobbyists to register with some oversight body and then
submit periodic reports concerning the identities of their clients, the funds they receive and
spend, and the subjects with respect to which they lobby.

Disclosure -- indeed, any regulation

of lobbying – requires a definition of what constitutes the “lobbying” subject to regulation. The
most significant unresolved issue in the definition of lobbying is whether “indirect” lobbying or
so-called “grassroots activities” -- that is, communications aimed not directly at public officials
but at the public in order to get people to contact lawmakers with respect to pending or proposed
government actions – should be treated as “lobbying” subject to disclosure. Other current
disclosure issues include whether lobbyists should be required to report more information
concerning the specific officials they lobby and concerning the sources of the funds used to pay
for their activities.
A. Grassroots Lobbying
As Dean Allard has explained, effective lobbying includes “efforts to inform and
leverage public opinion on an issue in order to shape political outcomes. Indirect advocacy
involves research institutions, education and public relations campaigns, mobilization and
strategic communication efforts, and coalition building, all of which take place outside of the
legislative chamber, but with obvious indirect effects.”189 The use of television and digital and
social media campaigns to “build support among voters and key elites” to influence legislative
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activity is increasingly integral to modern lobbying.190 Thomas Susman has pointed out that
“[g]rassroots organizing and public relations campaigns also accompany rulemaking
proceedings” in addition to legislative lobbying, and that with the rise of Internet organizing,
websites, blogs, banners, and more, grassroots lobbying has become more technologically
sophisticated and widespread.191 Professor William Luneburg observes that

“exhortations to

the public at large or various sectors thereof to contact Congress or the federal bureaucracy on an
issue or particular legislation or regulation is omnipresent today, particularly given the ease of
Internet access to persons who may react favorably to the exhortations and, with a few mouse
clicks and not much more effort, send the requested message or an edited version through
cyberspace to the requested target.” In his view, lobbying disclosure that omits grassroots
activity is “seriously incomplete assuming, as most commentators do, that it can contribute
significantly to the success of lobbying campaigns.”192 On the other hand, some activists and
scholars have opposed regulation of grassroots lobbying. Jay Alan Sekulow and Erik
Zimmerman of the American Center for Law and Justice have emphasized that “[g]rassroots
issue advocacy increases citizen participation in the democratic process by encouraging
Americans to exercise their right to inform their elected representatives about their positions on
important issues.” In their view, any regulation of grassroots lobbying, by imposing
administrative requirements with the attendant costs of compliance and penalties for
noncompliance, would significantly hamper ordinary citizens’ political activity, in violation of
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the First Amendment.193
Federal lobbying law does not apply to grassroots lobbying,194 but most state lobbying
disclosure laws do cover some grassroots lobbying activity. One 2009 study concluded that all
but thirteen states require reporting concerning some indirect lobbying expenditures. 195
Unsurprisingly, a number of these laws have been challenged in court, but courts have nearly
always upheld these requirements.
In Young Americans for Freedom, Inc. v. Gorton, the Washington Supreme Court in 1974
rejected a challenge to the Washington State law enacted two years earlier that required
disclosure of grassroots lobbying campaigns involving the expenditure of more than $500
within three months or $200 in one month “in presenting a program addressed to the public, a
substantial portion of which is designed or calculated primarily to influence legislation.” The
court found the requirement advanced the informational function generally justifying lobbying
disclosure. Indeed, it concluded that striking down the law “would leave a loophole for indirect
lobbying without allowing or providing the public with information and knowledge re the
sponsorship of the lobbying and its financial magnitude.”196 Two years later, the Michigan
Supreme Court in an advisory opinion that addressed a host of challenges to a proposed
campaign finance, government ethics, and lobbying measure found it would be permissible to
treat as lobbying subject to disclosure “soliciting others to communicate with an official in the
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legislative branch or an official in the executive branch for the purpose of influencing legislative
or administrative action” above the statutory dollar threshold, provided that the definition was
“interpreted to mean express and direct requests to so communicate.”197
The federal courts of appeals for the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, addressing challenges
to the lobbying disclosure laws of Minnesota and Florida, respectively, rejected claims that
regulating grassroots lobbying is unconstitutional. The Minnesota law defined lobbying to
include “attempting to influence legislative or administrative action by communicating or urging
others to communicate with public officials.” The National Rifle Association asserted it would
be unconstitutional to require it to report concerning letters and mailgrams the organization sent
to its Minnesota members urging them to contact their state legislators with respect to certain
legislative items. The Eighth Circuit, however, rejected the claim, finding that “when persons
engage in an extensive letter writing campaign for the purpose of influencing specific legislation,
the State’s interest is the same whether or not those persons are members of an association.”198
The Eleventh Circuit has twice upheld Florida’s grassroots lobbying disclosure
requirements. In Florida League of Professional Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs,199 in 1996, the court
observed that the governmental interest in disclosure of indirect lobbying efforts, including
media campaigns may in some ways be stronger than the case for disclosure of direct lobbying
because “when the pressures are indirect . . . they are harder to identify without the aid of
disclosure requirements.”200 In 2008, the court rejected a challenge to Florida’s requirement that
lobbyists report indirect communications, which the court noted might include opinion articles,
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issue advertisements and letter writing campaigns from lobbyists on behalf of their clients to the
press and public at large for the purpose of influencing legislation or policy. The court concluded
that the requirement was justified by the compelling interest in voters being able to appraise “the
integrity and performance of officeholders and candidates.”201
The only court decision going the other way is Montana Automobile Assn. v. Greely,202 in
which the Montana Supreme Court struck down the provision of Montana’s law that defined as a
“principal” not only someone who spends more than $1000 a year to engage a lobbyist but also a
person “other an individual” who spends above that threshold amount “to solicit, directly or
indirectly or by an advertising campaign, the lobbying efforts of another person.” The court
found that this could include the efforts of various organizations to ask their members to contact
public officials with respect to legislation, and concluded there was no compelling state interest
that would justify the burden on First Amendment rights such a provision would impose.203
The argument that applying disclosure requirements to grassroots lobbying is
unconstitutional relies primarily on the sentence in Harriss construing the Federal Regulation of
Lobbying Act of 1946 (“FRLA”) “to refer only to lobbying in its commonly accepted sense; to
direct communication with members of Congress on pending or proposed federal legislation”204
and the comparable reading of the FRLA by Rumely205 on which Harriss relied and quoted. But
Harriss and Rumely are actually consistent with mandatory disclosure of at least some grassroots
lobbying campaigns.
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First, Harriss does not say that requiring the disclosure of grassroots activity would be
unconstitutional, only that it could raise a more substantial constitutional question than
disclosure with respect to direct contacts with legislators and legislative staff. Invocation of the
constitutional avoidance canon reserves the constitutional question; it does not resolve it.
Second, and more importantly, Harriss actually treats at least some grassroots lobbying
as part of “lobbying in its commonly accepted sense.” The very next sentence after the one just
quoted states: “The legislative history of the Act makes clear that, at the very least, Congress
sought disclosure of such direct pressures, exerted by the lobbyist themselves or through their
hirelings or through an artificially stimulated letter campaign.”206 At that point, the opinion’s
footnote 10 cites to and quotes from the legislative history of the Act which indicates that the
first of the “three distinct classes of so-called lobbyists” to which the FRLA was intended to
apply consisted of “[t]hose who do not visit the Capitol but initiate propaganda from all over the
country, in the form of letters and telegrams, many of which have been based entirely upon
misinformation as to facts”207-- in other words, grassroots lobbying. Harriss on its own terms,
thus, appears to permit the application of disclosure requirements to at least some grassroots
lobbying.
Third, the informational interest served by the regulation of direct lobbying is equally
applicable to indirect lobbying. As Harriss found, there is an important government interest in
enabling members of Congress to find out from those attempting to influence them “who is being
hired, who is putting up the money, and how much.”208 With grassroots lobbying often a

206

347 U.S. at 620 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 620-21 (quoting from S. Rep. No. 1400, 79 th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 27; Committee Print, July 26, 1946,
statement by Representative Monroney on Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 32-33.)
208
Id. at 625.
207

64

component of efforts to influence legislative and regulatory processes, disclosure of the source
and scope of grassroots lobbying activities can provide valuable information both to government
officials and to the general public. Indeed, as the Eleventh Circuit observed, disclosure may be
more valuable here than for direct lobbying because the sponsors and extent of grassroots
lobbying efforts may be much less apparent than the interests behind face-to-face lobbying.209
Finally, in the half-century since Harriss the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld
federal campaign finance laws that require the reporting and disclosure of political expenditures
aimed at the general public. Indeed, the Court has invoked the important public interest in
informing voters about the interests behind electoral communications to uphold disclosure
requirements even as it has struck down associated substantive limits on electoral expenditures.
In Buckley v. Valeo,210 the Court invalidated the provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA) that would have limited how much individuals or committees could spend independently
(e.g., not in contributions to candidates, parties, or political action committees) to support or
oppose candidates for office, but it upheld the requirement that such expenditures above a
threshold amount be reported. More recently, in Citizens United the Court upheld the application
of the requirements of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) for the reporting of
independent electioneering communications above a dollar threshold to corporations even as it
struck down all limits on corporate campaign spending. The Court reaffirmed its prior position
that disclosure of the identity of the person, group, or organization paying for an electioneering
communication advances the important public interest in voter information. Although campaign
finance is not on all-fours with lobbying, the two forms of political engagement are similar and
209
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have been treated by the Court as triggering similar constitutional concerns. As a result, the
Court’s determination that disclosure of the financing of electoral communications aimed at the
public does not violate the First Amendment would support a determination that at least some
disclosure of grassroots lobbying would be constitutional as well.
Nor is judicial support for disclosure limited to candidate elections. The Supreme Court
has clearly indicated, albeit without expressly deciding, that disclosure requirements can be
applied to organizations seeking to influence the public in ballot proposition elections.211 The
courts of appeals have regularly upheld the constitutionality of state laws requiring financial
disclosures by committees active in ballot proposition campaigns.

212

Ballot committee

campaigns to influence voter decisions whether to enact or defeat proposed state laws or
constitutional amendments, closely resembles grassroots lobbying to influence legislative or
executive branch actions.
Applying disclosure requirements to grassroots activity raises at least two further
questions. First, should such a requirement apply only to those whose direct lobbying activities
have already triggered the duty to register as a lobbyist and file periodic reports, or may
grassroots activity alone, without any direct contacts with legislative or executive branch
officials, trigger a duty to register and report? Second, what kinds of communications aimed at
the public should be treated as “lobbying,” as opposed to a more general discussion or advocacy
concerning public issues?
On the first question, limiting the disclosure requirement to lobbyists already required to
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register because of their direct lobbying contacts with public officials is certainly less
burdensome. Mandating the inclusion of grassroots expenditures in a quarterly or semi-annual
report would be a merely incremental change to a pre-existing reporting requirement rather than
the addition of an entirely new regulatory obligation. By contrast, for an individual or
organization not engaged in lobbying in the traditional sense, imposition of a registration and
reporting requirement for the dissemination of communications aimed at the general public or
the organization’s members could come as a surprise and impinge on the ability to engage in
political activity. However, from the perspective of providing government decision-makers or
the public with information about lobbying campaigns, it does not make a difference if an
organization engaged in grassroots activity is also involved in more traditional face-to-face
lobbying. Limiting a registration and reporting requirement to grassroots expenditures above a
fairly high dollar threshold, however, would mitigate the burden by focusing the obligation on
individuals or organizations engaged in a significant level of activity.213 These are also the
lobbying programs for which the public information value of disclosure is greatest.
The second question resembles the issue central to campaign finance regulation over how
to distinguish between electioneering communications which may be subject to disclosure
requirements and general political speech about issues – including communications that may
mention candidates -- that is not considered to be electioneering and therefore not subject to
disclosure. In the lobbying context, disclosure could be limited to(i) communications that refer to
a specific bill or a clearly identified pending or proposed executive or legislative action, or (ii)
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messages that expressly call on listeners, viewers, or readers to contact a government official.
The first approach has the benefit of limiting regulation to communications

addressing

relatively determinate government actions. Much as an election is a particularly focused form of
political activity, limiting the definition of lobbying to communications that refer to a particular
bill or other proposed official action would also limit regulation to communications that

aim at

a particular government decision rather than discuss public policy generally. Thus, when the
Washington Supreme Court upheld that state’s grassroots disclosure requirement, the court noted
that under state law “reporting would not be required when the subject campaign does not have
as its object the support or rejection of specific legislation.”214 The difficulty with this approach,
however, would be defining a particular legislative proposal and distinguishing it from a broader
legislative subject, especially as particular proposals change during the legislative process.
Would a message dealing with health insurance reform be sufficiently focused to be treated as
lobbying, or would it have to refer to “Obamacare,” “Medicaid expansion,”

individual

mandate, or a specific bill number to trigger an obligation to report spending?
The second approach of limiting “lobbying” to messages that expressly call on the
recipient to contact government officials to urge them to take a particular action provides a
clearer standard. It is more consistent with the traditional definition of lobbying as involving
contacts with government officials and with the Court’s express advocacy standard in campaign
finance disclosure, which focuses on communications that call on the recipient to take the action
of voting for or against the candidate mentioned in the message. Thus, the Michigan Supreme
Court interpreted that state’s proposal for the disclosure of indirect lobbying to apply only to
“express and direct requests to [others to] communicate” with officials for the purpose of
214
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influencing legislative or administrative action.215 This approach is also more consistent with
Rumely. As the Court explained, the activity of Rumely’s organization that attracted the attention
of the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities was “the sale of books of a particular
political tendentiousness.”216 There was no claim that the books called on readers to contact
government officials. Rather, Committee Chairman Buchanan’s concern was with “attempts ‘to
saturate the thinking of the community. ’”217 The Rumely Court was troubled by a Congressional
investigation into efforts to influence public thinking generally rather than the legislative process
more specifically. Such more general efforts to affect public opinion would be exempt from
regulation under a definition of grassroots lobbying that limits coverage to messages to the
public which use language calling on message recipients to contact government officials.
A grassroots lobbying disclosure requirement that survives a facial constitutional attack
could still be subject to an as-applied challenge. In upholding FECA’s campaign finance
disclosure provision, Buckley observed there could be cases where an organization could show
that disclosure of its activities would likely result in harassment or threats of reprisal to
contributors or members. If so, the organization could obtain an exemption from even a valid
disclosure law. Similar reasoning would presumably apply in the grassroots lobbying disclosure
context, although given that such disclosure would likely be focused on organizational
expenditures rather contributors, members, or the identities of the recipients of the organization’s
messages, the need for an as-applied exception would not be likely to arise.
B. Other Disclosure Issues
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(1)Contact disclosure. Disclosure ought to require lobbyists to identify the government
officials lobbied. For all their attention to the money spent on lobbying, relatively few disclosure
laws require the reporting of the specific contacts a lobbyist makes with a legislator, staff
member, or executive branch officer in the course of lobbying. Instead, disclosure laws, such as
the federal Lobbying Disclosure Act,218 tend to focus on the reporting of how much was spent
on lobbying during the reporting period and on identifying the clients. A registered federal
lobbyist must report on the “general issue area in which the registrant engaged in lobbying
activities, specific issues upon which a lobbyist employed by the registrant engaged in lobbying
activities, including, to the maximum extent practicable, a list of bill numbers and references to
specific executive branches;” and “a statement of the Houses of Congress and the Federal
agencies contacted by lobbyists employed by the registrant on behalf of the client.”219 But the
lobbyist need not report the specific actions requested of the officials lobbied, or identify the
officials lobbied or even, the specific congressional committee or subcommittee, or the specific
agency bureau, unit, or division, contacted.
Contact disclosure would require lobbyists to disclose the specific officials, or at least the
specific congressional offices, congressional committees, and federal agency offices, contacted
and to provide more information about the content of that contact than the number of the bill and
a reference to executive branch actions. If the purpose of lobbying transparency is to serve the
public interest in understanding “the efforts of paid lobbyists to influence the public
decision-making process,”220 contact disclosure would be at least as valuable as disclosure of the
amount of money spent on lobbying. Indeed, only contact disclosure can actually demonstrate
218
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the links between particular lobbyists and particular elected officials or senior agency appointees.
When combined with the reporting of campaign contributions and other forms of financial
assistance to the same elected officials, contact disclosure could give a fuller picture of the
interactions between interest groups and government. The ABA Task Force Report called for a
version of contact disclosure focused on congressional offices and committees, rather than
specific individuals, 221 and the Sunlight Foundation has developed a model Lobbying
Transparency Act which would require reporting the names of the officials contacted.222 The city
of San Francisco amended its Lobbying Ordinance in 2010 to require monthly reports by
registered lobbyists that include the name of each city officer with whom the lobbyist made a
contact during the reporting period, the date of the contact, and the “local legislative or
administrative action that the lobbyist sought to influence, including, if any, the title and file
number of any resolution, motion, appeal, application, petition, nomination, ordinance,
amendment, approval, referral, permit, license, entitlement, or contract, and the outcome sought
by the client.”223
An alternative approach would be to require the officials lobbied to publicly report on
their contacts with lobbyists. Professor Anita Krishnakumar proposed this in her 2007 article,224
and President Obama in his 2011 State of the Union Message called on Congress “to do what the
White House has already done” and put online information about “when your elected officials
221
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are meeting with lobbyists”225 -- although the proposal was rejected by Congressional leaders
out of hand.226 As the goal of transparency is to get a better public understanding of the interest
group pressures on public officials, disclosure by officials of lobbyist contacts makes some
sense. But focusing contact disclosure efforts on the lobbyists rather than the officials is likely to
be more successful. Public officials may not always know whether the people with whom they
are meeting are lobbyists. Indeed, in some cases, whether an individual is to be treated as a
regulated lobbyist may vary across, or within, reporting periods depending on the extent of the
individual’s lobbying activity. Public officials need not ordinarily maintain detailed logs of all
their meetings. And enforcement of reporting requirements against public officials, including
compliance with reporting time deadlines, is likely to be difficult. Registered lobbyists, by
contrast, know who they are; likely already keep time logs in order to bill their clients; and
already have to file periodic reports. Lobbying regulators are likely to be more vigorous in
enforcing requirements against private lobbyists than public officials. Moreover, resistance to
adopting contact disclosure is likely to be far greater if the disclosure has to be made by the
lawmakers themselves instead of the lobbyists. The ABA Task Force Report recommends that
registered lobbyists be required to report “all congressional offices, congressional committees,
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and federal agencies and offices contacted.”227 As the Report observes, such disclosure would
directly serve the social interest in tracing the impact of lobbying on public decision-making.228
(2) Coalition lobbying.

Some significant lobbying campaigns are undertaken by trade

associations, coalitions, or umbrella organizations that act on behalf of a collection of businesses
or interest groups with a stake in an issue.

Traditional disclosure laws might require the

organization formally undertaking the lobbying or hiring the lobbyist – or organized for the sole
purpose of lobbying -- to disclose its actions, but would provide little information concerning the
identity of the businesses, ideological groups, individuals, or other interests behind and financing
the lobbying. The problem of obtaining adequate information about the groups actually
responsible for lobbying is analogous to the increasingly salient campaign finance issue of
spending by 501(c)(4) non-profit social welfare organizations and 501(c)(6) trade associations,
which are required to disclose the fact and amount of their spending but not the identities of the
individuals our firms supplying their funds. For both lobbying and campaign finance, the
growing role of organizations with anodyne names that are specially created for electoral or
legislative advocacy and do not disclose the sources of their funding or the amounts given to
them undermines the goal of political transparency. HLOGA addresses this problem partially by
require the disclosure of the identity of any organization that contributes more than $5000 to a
registered lobbyist or client in a quarterly period and also actively participates in the planning,
supervision or control of the registrant’s lobbying activities. The United States Court of Appeals
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for the District of Columbia Circuit in National Association of Manufacturers v. Taylor229
sustained this enhanced disclosure requirement in the fact of a host of First Amendment
objections.
Coalition lobbying may also involve grassroots campaigns. In New York, which has
experienced extensive grassroots lobbying by coalitions of organizations intending to influence
state budget decisions, the legislature in 2012 enacted a bill proposed by Governor Andrew
Cuomo requiring any organization that spends at least $50,000 and three percent of its total
expenditures on lobbying in a year to report the identity any donor that contributes at least $5000
to the lobbying effort.230 One consequence of the law was that the Committee to Save New
York, a business-backed coalition which was the highest spending lobbying group in New York
in 2011 and 2012231 and spent more than $13 million to promote Governor Cuomo’s agenda,
“went dormant as soon as the state began requiring disclosure of donors.”232 By going beyond
the disclosure of major donors actively involved in organizational lobbying decisions and
seeking to reach all major donors, whether involved in an organization’s lobbying efforts or not,
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the New York law may be pushing the edge of the constitutional envelope. But the law and the
political context in which it emerged underscore the need for enhanced disclosure of the sources
behind coalition lobbying.

VI. Conclusion
Although lobbying is often treated as a relatively recent phenomenon, its place in our
representative system has been intensely debated by courts for nearly two centuries. For much of
that time, the efforts of paid advocates to influence the legislative process were treated as tending
to corrupt the republican form of government, yet even then many judges recognized that
individuals, firms, and groups have legitimate interests in government action and that paid
advocates can be appropriate intermediaries for seeking government decisions to advance those
actions. Since the mid-twentieth century, the debate over the regulation of lobbying has been
constitutionalized, with the Supreme Court grounding lobbying activity in the First
Amendment’s protections of speech, association, and petition. But even then, the courts have
recognized that the dangers of hidden and unfair improper influence justify many regulations of
lobbying particularly disclosure. Indeed, the concerns central to the nineteenth century critique of
lobbying – secret contacts, provision of private pecuniary benefits, misuse of personal influence,
special access – remain salient to contemporary lobbying laws and the constitutional issues they
implicate.
Changes in lobbying practice raise new challenges for lobbying law. The increasing
interpenetration of lobbying with candidate election finance on the one hand, and public relations
campaigns on the other, have led for new calls (and some laws) that go beyond what the
Supreme Court in the 1950s called “lobbying in its commonly accepted sense” to reach
75

lobbyists’ involvement in campaign fundraising lawmakers and “grassroots” public advocacy
communications. These and other current lobbying law disputes – such as the Obama
administration’s reverse revolving door rules – require consideration of whether lobbying poses a
special danger of corruption or its appearance, what role special interests may legitimately play
in the political process, and when is it appropriate to regulate, if only through disclosure,
non-electoral political advocacy. The legal and regulatory balancing act of holding together First
Amendment rights, controls on improper, and promoting government transparency may be more
difficult than ever.
After nearly two centuries, the debate over whether and when lobbying is a corruptive
form of special interest influence or an appropriate – indeed, constitutionally protected -- means
of seeking to educate and influence government decision-making remains unresolved.
likely to remain so for some time to come.
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It is

